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ABSTRACT
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, advocates for forest conservation thought that
climate change could provide a lever to motivate developing countries to reduce
deforestation. Fifteen years after the first climate change convention, however,
global emissions from deforestation have increased. This thesis uses Costa Rica
as a case study to examine how international climate policies and carbon
markets have addressed greenhouse gas emissions from tropical deforestation. I
argue that, to date, the international climate regime has failed to provide effective
incentives to Costa Rica to finance its forestry reforms because of political
decisions that favor forest protection in developed over developing countries. To
be effective, the international climate regime needs to generate a substantial
financial investment for avoided deforestation in developing countries and
develop flexible policies that build capacity, promote sustainable forestry
practices, and reward early reformers.
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INTRODUCTION
Tropical forests provide myriad environmental and social benefits. Although they
cover only 10 percent of the Earth's surface, tropical forests contain more than
50 percent of its species and over 25 percent of its carbon reserves (Hecht and
Orlando 1998). Forests mitigate global and local environmental problems, such
as desertification, air, water and soil pollution, and deteriorating coral reefs and
fisheries.' In addition, activities like agroforestry and sustainable harvesting
benefit rural communities by generating income and sustainable livelihoods
(Swingland 2003).
Despite the well-established environmental and social benefits of
conserving forests, tropical deforestation continues at an alarming rate, and
international efforts to protect forests in developing countries have largely been
unsuccessful. Many developing country governments have resisted international
norms and policies that would prevent timber companies and agro-industries
from exploiting forests. Moreover, the international community has not
committed to compensating countries for forest conservation. Consequently, to
many developing countries the value of cutting down trees, however marginal,
appears to be greater than that of protecting forests. The low premium put on
conserving natural forests by international agreements not only fails to reduce
deforestation, but also makes it difficult for those who want to preserve their
'Tropical forests moderate streamflow and absorb nutrients such as phosphorous and nitrogen. In coastal areas, this
moderation and absorption can help prevent eutrophication.
forests to finance forest reforms.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became apparent that climate change
could provide a lever for advocates of forest conservation to motivate developing
countries to reduce deforestation. Scientists pointed out that land-use changes,
principally tropical deforestation in developing countries, account for 20 percent
of the human-induced greenhouse gas emissions annually -releasing more
carbon dioxide than all the cars and trucks in the world (Gelling 2008). Most
economists also agreed that the cheapest and most efficient way of reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions would be to provide incentives to developing
countries to curb their rates of deforestation and increase forest cover (Newell
and Stavins 2000). In 1992, in response to this consensus, international
negotiators began creating a mechanism to address deforestation. This
mechanism, later known as the Climate Development Mechanism, was touted as
win-win opportunity: to reduce the costs of compliance developed countries had
an incentive to invest large amounts of capital in developing countries, while
developing countries finally would receive the financing needed to conserve their
forests.
Yet since the first UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992,
global emissions from deforestation have increased. In fact, primarily as a result
of deforestation, Indonesia has become the third biggest global emitter in the
world, following the U.S. and China (Gelling 2007). Although domestic political
choices explain part of the increasing trend in deforestation, it is clear that the
international climate change regime has failed to address the continuing
deforestation in developing countries.
This thesis uses Costa Rica as a case study to examine how international
climate policies and carbon markets have attempted to stem greenhouse gas
emissions from tropical deforestation. It asks: 1) How successful has Costa Rica
been in using international climate policies and carbon markets to support its
sustainable forestry reforms? 2) What factors have made it more or less
successful? Costa Rica provides a strong case to examine the effectiveness of
international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation
because the Costa Rican govemment has the political will to reduce
deforestation and the capacity to participate in a sophisticated global climate
regime; at the same time, Costa Rica faces the same challenge as other
developing countries in financing domestic forestry reform. According to scholars
who study environmental aid, capacity and concern are two of the "three Cs" that
typically limit the effectiveness of international environmental aid to developing
countries. The third, contracting, depends on the mechanism for distributing
funds. Costa Rica thus represents what is known in political science as a "most
likely case": if Costa Rica is unsuccessful at using international policies to finance
its forestry reforms, it is difficult to imagine how another developing country could
manage; there is almost certainly a flaw in the international mechanism for
disbursing funds.
I argue that, to date, Costa Rica has been unable to use international
climate policies and carbon markets to finance the forestry reforms that it hoped
to undertake because of political decisions that favor the interests of developed
countries over those of forestry advocates in developing countries. Although
nearly all countries have agreed on the need to address climate change,
domestic priorities have determined which policies were included and excluded
as remedies. In the negotiations over incentives for land-use and forestry
projects, countries with greater political bargaining power and stronger alliances
have consistently prevailed. The resulting rules included deforestation incentives
for developed countries but not for developing countries. Furthermore, efforts to
reduce uncertainty and quantify carbon sequestration as accurately as possible
have yielded rules that are much more complex and cumbersome for developing
countries than for developed countries. Not only have international climate
policies failed to promote widespread reforestation, but they also have created a
perverse incentive to develop projects that maximize carbon sequestration at the
expense of other social and environmental benefits. In fact, the Climate
Development Mechanism actually penalizes Costa Rica for its earlier reforms
because it focuses solely on incremental carbon uptake at a project level instead
of widespread national changes in reforestation and deforestation. Voluntary
international carbon markets offer early reformers like Costa Rica some financing
opportunities, but without mandatory caps such markets are unlikely to serve as
an adequate source of financing because of the low price of offsets.
Though Costa Rica initially hoped to finance its own sustainable forestry
reform through international climate policies and carbon markets, it has shifted its
strategy from a market-based approach focused on the international arena to one
that relies primarily on domestic regulation. As the international climate regime
refocuses its efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation in the next
commitment period, the Costa Rican case suggests the need for more flexible
policies that encourage developing countries to reduce their deforestation levels,
promote healthy biologically diverse and socially beneficial forests, and reward
early reformers for their contribution to addressing deforestation. Nonetheless,
to be effective, developed countries need to take on deeper emissions cuts to
generate the capital necessary to save tropical forests.
I ground this argument about Costa Rica's experience in the literature on
the following topics: climate change and developing countries, land use and
forestry issues, the debate over CDM as a way to promote sustainable
development, international carbon trading, the role of science in policymaking
and international environmental treaties and aid.
My analysis of the Costa Rican case is based on primary and secondary
source materials. I conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals familiar
with Costa Rica's conservation and climate policies, as well as experts on the
CDM and international carbon trading. The list of interviewees is in Appendix A,
and particular projects are described in Appendices B, C, and D.
ASPIRATIONS FOR ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY
Although it once had the highest deforestation rate in the western hemisphere,
through a series of reforms from 1980s to the early 1990s, Costa Rica
succeeded in reducing its deforestation rate from 59,000 hectares to 4,000
hectares per year. Nonetheless, domestic political opposition, international
pressure to reduce public spending, and new scientific findings jeopardized the
country's conservation policies. In 1992, however, international climate policy
created an opportunity to finance a long-term sustainable forestry policy, and
Costa Rica tried to capitalize off it: domestically, the government created policies,
institutions, and projects to take advantage of the funds from the newly created
Activities Implemented Jointly program; internationally, Costa Rican negotiators
fought against other developing countries for a permanent climate financing
mechanism. Despite these efforts, Costa Rica struggled to finance most of its
forestry projects during the AIJ period, because it overestimated the demand and
price for the unregulated offsets market. Although it met few of its objectives,
during the 1990s, Costa Rica positioned itself as a leader in carbon forestry
projects and its innovations helped shape the new regulatory market.
Past Forest Policy: A Struggle for Consensus
Although in 1980 Costa Rica had the highest deforestation rate in the Western
hemisphere, through a series of policy reforms between the 1960s and 1980s,
Costa Rica succeed in reducing deforestation and now boasts that 23 percent of
the country's 5.2 million hectare landmass is designated as protected areas
(InBio 2000). Yet Costa Rica has struggled to maintain its forest conservation
initiatives because of domestic political opposition and international pressure to
reduce public spending.
In 1950 an estimated 60 to 90 percent of the Costa Rica's 52,000 square
kilometer surface area was forest cover. By 1987, however, only 17 percent of
the nation's forest cover remained (Scnchez-Azofeifa et al. 2003). Farmers
cleared land for coffee and bananas or cattle grazing, and developers razed
trees to accommodate a growing population. As a result, by 1980 Costa Rica
was losing four percent of its forest cover, approximately 59,000 hectares,
annually (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al 2003; de Camino et al 2000).
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s Costa Rican policymakers tried to
stem the rate of forest loss. Most notably, in 1986 President Oscar Arias passed
one of the country's most environmentally protective forestry laws. It created the
ministry of environment (originally called MINEREM and changed in 1992 to
MINAE) and transferred the authority over forests and national parks from the
ministry of agriculture and livestock to the new ministry.2 The 1986 Forestry Law
also reversed an existing law that gave settlers land rights if they cleared public
2 MINEREM stands for Ministerio de Recursos Naturales, Energia, y Minas and MINAE for Ministerio de Ambiente y
Energia.
lands, consolidated national parks into a protected area system, and required
landowners to acquire approval before cutting down trees on forested lands. In
addition, from 1986 to 1994 Costa Rica developed a series of loan and grant
programs to encourage commercial reforestation and environmentally-sound
forest management on private lands. Together these reforms helped curb
deforestation to 4,000 hectares per year (FONAFIFO 2005).
Many of these reforms were politically and economically unstable,
however. In 1990 the Supreme Court contested the legality of the 1986 law,
which had passed through Executive Decree instead of by a two-thirds majority
in the Legislative Assembly. Discontented landowners and the commercial
logging industry had challenged the law, claiming it violated their private property
rights (Fairman 1998). In a subsequent case the court ruled that the government
was required to compensate private estates within the expanded national park
boundaries for the indemnification of their lands (Vohringer 2004; Dutschke
2000). The court asserted that until landowners had been compensated, these
areas were not officially protected. From 1990 to 1994, conflict among
commercial loggers, private landowners, agricultural interests and
conservationists thwarted efforts to pass a new forest law under the Calderon
administration (Fairman 1998).
Concerned about the longevity of existing conservation efforts,
conservationists began to pressure the government to enhance coverage and
public ownership of its national parks by purchasing private lands. While the
landowner-incentive programs were politically popular, many conservation
groups considered them temporary and insufficient to protect biodiversity in the
long term (Janzen 2008). Additional policies were needed to consolidate the
national parks in perpetuity. In 1994 a group of conservationists released the
GRUAS report calling for Costa Rica to increase its forest cover under protection
by an additional ten percent.3 The report identified areas of biological importance
that existing protected areas did not cover, as well as areas without biological
importance that were currently protected. The writers argued that that new land
needed to be incorporated into the national park system, while other parcels
could be discarded. Such a reconfiguration, they said, would protect 90 percent
of the country's biodiversity (which accounts for four percent of the world's
biodiversity) (Salazar et al. 2000; Janzen 2008).
In addition to political challenges, the landowner incentive programs faced
an uncertain economic future. From 1979 to 1996 Costa Rican subsidies to
forestry totaled $100 million (de Camino et al. 2000). International institutions,
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, put pressure on Costa
Rica to reduce public subsidies. For example, in order to comply with the terms
of its third Structural Adjustment Loan, the World Bank wanted Costa Rica to
cancel many subsidies to the forestry sector (de Camino et al. 2000).
International financing for conservation was also unreliable. The Global
Environmental Facility (GEF), which is in charge of disbursing funds for
international environmental conventions, is chronically under funded and
burdened by other conflicts (Fairman 1996). More generally, international
The name GRUAS was a play on words. GRUAS is the Spanish name for industrial tow truck company. According to
Daniel Janzen, director of the Guanacaste Conservation Area, Costa Rica's environmental reforms were stuck in the mud.
Only an industrial strength government effort could get it out.
financing to Costa Rica has declined at a higher rate than to other countries
(Murillo 2008).
The Climate Convention and Developing Countries
Even as Costa Rica struggled with the political and economic fallout from its
domestic forestry reforms, an opportunity arose in the international arena. The
1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the first
international response to global climate change.4 At the time, there was
considerable scientific uncertainty about the precise impacts of climate change
and how best to address it, but the parties agreed in 1992 that given the potential
dangers of climate change, scientific uncertainty did not justify inaction. The goal
of the UNFCCC negotiations was to develop a strategy to stabilize the
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous interference with the climate system. Although developing countries
resisted emissions commitments of their own, all parties agreed to allow for a
period of experimentation in which countries could implement offset projects
jointly.
In the negotiations over the UNFCCC, most developing countries
demanded to be exempt from any emissions reduction. Their arguments were
both ethical and practical. They argued that as the main emitters of greenhouse
gases, developed countries should take the lead in addressing the problem.
4 Since the 19 th century, atmospheric CO 2 concentrations have increased by about 25 percent, mainly due to the
combustion of fossil fuels and land use changes. Over the last century, this accumulation has resulted in an increase in
global surface temperatures of about 0.6 degrees centigrade, which is projected to increase between 1.4 to 5.8 degrees
over the course of the 2 1st century. Although scientists have been tracing these increases since the 1970s, in 1990, the
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its first report confirming that global warming was a threat and
calling on nations to develop a treaty to address the problem (UNFCCC 2002). This report influenced nations to form the
UNFCCC.
Moreover, industrialized countries had the money to pay for emissions reduction.
In contrast, they said, developing countries were resource poor and had more
pressing concerns, such as economic development to meet their basic material
needs (Moomaw et al. 1999; Richards 2001).
In order to differentiate the responsibilities of developed and developing
countries, the UNFCCC divided parties into two groups: Annex I countries that
include industrialized countries, and non-Annex I parties mainly made up of
developing countries. To demonstrate their leadership, Annex I parties were
expected to adopt climate change policies, reduce emission to 1990 levels, and
help developing countries reduce their emissions through financial resources and
technology transfer (Article 4).
Despite these commitments, the framework convention did not set any
legally binding targets for emissions reductions on either party. In April 1995, at
the first Conference of Parties (COP1), in a decision known as the Berlin
Mandate, the parties agreed to launch a new round of talks to decide on stronger
commitments for Annex I countries. Those discussions culminated in the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, in which Annex I countries agreed to reduce their emissions by at
least five percent below their 1990 levels.
In addition to agreeing to another round of negotiations, at the COP1, all
parties agreed to allow a pilot phase of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).
Under AIJ, developers from Annex I countries could implement projects that
reduced or sequestered greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries or
jointly with other developed countries. Since the cost of developing a carbon
offset project is lower in developing countries than it is in industrialized countries,
and the environmental effect is the same, some Annex I parties argued that joint
implementation was the key to a cost-effective climate change policy (UNFCCC
2002). A 1998 World Bank study showed that it would cost Annex I countries
$120 billion to reduce emissions by five percent below 1990 levels through
domestic initiatives alone--a cost that dropped to $11 billion if joint
implementation with developing countries was allowed (Chomitz 2000).5
Although AIJ did not count toward future emissions targets, countries like
Norway and the United States, who were concerned about the cost-effectiveness
of greenhouse gas mitigation, were enthusiastic about the potential of the
program and invested heavily in the AIJ pilot. They viewed joint implementation
as a win-win situation: it provided technology and financial transfers to
developing countries while giving wealthy countries flexibility to meet their
emissions reductions commitments in a cost-effective way. But many developing
countries saw it differently. For them, this flexibility allowed wealthy countries to
shirk their responsibility for global warming and impose more conditions on
much-needed development assistance. Making matters worse, AIJ would allow
foreign developers to implement projects in developing countries that were not in
those nations' best interests (Werksman and Cameron 2000). Nonetheless, they
agreed to a period of experimentation, leaving the negotiations about a
permanent mechanism for a later date.
Forestry and other land use offset projects were encouraged during AIJ.
5 Another study indicates that these costs for Annex I implementation would be $250 billion dollars if they did it alone; $80
billion if investments in developing countries was allowed (Castro et al 2000).
Although scientists were uncertain about how much carbon forests actually store
and their methods to quantify this sequestration were relatively crude, AIJ
provided an opportunity to learn by doing--to develop baselines and improve
methods of quantification and verification, which could be used later for offset
projects that counted towards Annex I party obligations. At the time, scientific
studies estimated that deforestation in tropical areas had contributed between 20
to 40 percent of the global emissions of carbon dioxide during the 1980s
(Houghton 1990; Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006). Annex I countries that
supported AIJ also were also particularly enthusiastic about forest projects
because they believed that the cost for developing and implementing these
projects were low compared to energy projects (Newell and Stavins 2000).
Unlike many of their developing country counterparts, Costa Rican
policymakers were optimistic about the potential of AIJ and future international
climate policies to finance the forestry reforms that it wanted to undertake. A
1993 World Bank study on the economic value of Costa Rican forests had
estimated that 66 percent of the benefits generated from national forests went to
the global community (de Camino et al. 2000). Based on this calculation, Costa
Rican policymakers hoped to generate the bulk of their forestry financing from
the climate market. Of the 145 projects listed under AIJ, ten were in Costa Rica,
five in energy and five in forestry (see Appendix B ) (UNFCCC; UNFCCC 2008;
Werksman and Cameron 2000).6 Costa Rican officials hoped to use
international climate policies to reverse the country's deforestation, conserve its
6 Castro 2000 claims that there were 15 projects proposed, but the UNFCCC official website only has a record of 10.
According to Tattenbach, Costa Rican policymakers including himself may have been exaggerating the number of
projects (Tattenbach 2008). In addition, the UNFCCC claims that there were 145 projects but only 77 are listed.
biodiversity, and stimulate rural development.
Reframing the Value of Forests to Include Sequestration
In 1994, the year that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change came
into effect, Costa Ricans elected a new president, Jose Maria Figueres. Building
on the momentum of the Rio Convention, Figueres announced his plan to
promote "sustainable development in alliance with nature" in all government
policies (Fairman 1998). While Figueres hoped to pass a new forest law, he
faced many of the same problems as his predecessors. He needed to unite
different constituencies who had resisted the previous administration's attempts
to reform the country's forestry law. He simultaneously faced pressure from
conservationist groups to consolidate protected lands. And he had to find new
sources of financing for its initiatives. The potential for international climate
financing created an opportunity to address these different challenges. In the
next four years of the Figueres administration, Costa Rican conservationists
created policies, institutions, and projects to take advantage of the international
carbon funds and permanently establish its forest reforms.
To prepare for AIJ, in 1994, President Figueres established the Costa
Rican Office of Joint Implementation (OCIC) to act as the coordinating body for
joint implementation projects. 7 The role of OCIC was to promote carbon sales on
the international market and represent Costa Rica in future climate negotiations
(UNFCCC n.d.; Salazar et al. 2000). OCIC signed contracts that would allow
Costa Rica to implement projects jointly with the U.S., Norway, Holland,
7 OCIC stands for la Oficina Costarricense de Implementacion Conjunta
Switzerland and Finland (Castro et al. 2000).
In the first two years of AIJ, Costa Rican conservationists experimented
with a variety of carbon forestry projects that would become the basis for its
comprehensive policy reforms. In 1994 the newly appointed head of OCIC,
Franz Tattenbach, proposed Carfix--a 108,265 hectare conservation and
restoration project-to the U.S. AIJ board. Carfix promised to generate $32
million over twenty years for public land restoration and landowner incentives
(Janzen 2008; UNFCCC 1994). Tattenbach, who was also the director of a
conservation non-profit FUNDECOR, in the Central Volcanic Mountain Range
Region near the country's capital, proposed Carfix as a pragmatic way to
conserve lands that could buffer of the World Biosphere Reserve of Braulio
Carrillo National Park. Approximately two-thirds of the lands were within a
protected area but were highly degraded, and a third were marginal pasturelands
or degraded forests on private lands. Funds were needed to ensure that
"farmers and landowners have a sufficient annual income to provide competitive
alternatives to land uses that lead to deforestation" (UNFCCC 1994). Carfix
proposed employing a mix of commercial forestry and natural regeneration
(UNFCCC 1994; Dutschke 2000).
Adapting the Carfix model, one of the writers of the GRUAS report, Daniel
Janzen, developed a 58,000-hectare project called Biodiverfix on the Pacific
Coast for the Guanacaste Conservation Area. Rather than providing incentives
to landowners, Janzen proposed using the carbon offsets generated through
restoration and conservation to buy up private lands within the national park
boundary and fund park restoration and maintenance for 20 years (UNFCCC
1994; Janzen 2008). Janzen envisioned using the international carbon market to
finance the reforms advocated in the GRUAS report. A similar 2500-hectare
project, called Ecoland, was also established in the southwestern Osa Peninsula
(UNFCCC 1994).
These three projects proposals, all initiated by conservationists,
highlighted the possibility of using international climate finance to mitigate the
domestic conflict over the earlier reforms. They could be used both to finance
landowner incentives favored by the commercial timber industry and small
landowners and the national park consolidation advocated by conservationists.
In fact, these three projects helped shape Costa Rica's new comprehensive
environmental policy and the government's approach to carbon financing.8
In 1996 Costa Rica developed a new forestry law that enabled it to receive
and distribute future carbon funds to both private landowners and the national
park system-thereby mitigating both of the main tensions that had arisen over
its earlier forestry reforms. The objectives of the 1996 Forestry Law were:
To stimulate conservation, protection, and administration of natural
forests for biodiversity, to promote the production and development
of forest resources in a sustainable way, and to generate
employment and an increase in the standard of living in the rural
population (La Gaceta 1996).
8 Paul F Steinberg notes the importance of these "bilateral activists" who operate simultaneously in the domestic and
international arena in shaping domestic environmental policies in developing countries. These individuals who typically
function outside the bureaucracy have close ties to domestic parties and bureaucrats and work also with international
organizations and financing institutions. Janzen has roots with the Nature Conservancy and Tattenbach has close ties to a
number of donor agencies and through his work with OCIC to the UNFCCC. They both are strongly affiliated with the
National Liberation Party (PLC) (Steinberg 2001).
In order to realize these objectives, the law established two main programs: one
focused on private landowners and another on national park consolidation.
Generating revenue through the international carbon market was the focal
strategy for financing these two programs. According to Costa Rica's
environmental minister at the time, Rene Castro, Costa Rica would be a testing
ground for the "hypothesis that markets could be used to drive sustainable
development" (Castro et al. 2000).
In collaboration with the OCIC, Castro refashioned the country's existing
small grant programs into a single, market-based program to finance forest
conservation on private lands. The new program, known as the Pagos de
Servicios Ambientales or PSA, authorized the government to finance
"environmental service payments" to landowners by selling services, including
carbon sequestration, on the national and international markets. As with the
original grant program, the government paid landowners enrolled in the program
for activities such as conservation, sustainable management and commercial
reforestation. Instead of offering grants or loans to support these activities,
however, the government paid landowners for the environmental benefits that
their activities generated. In effect, the new PSA program transformed what had
been a subsidy for forestry activities into a payment for an environmental service,
such as carbon sequestration, which now had a market value thanks to the
international climate change policies. Commenting on this new approach to
forestry finance, Castro argued that "the sale and exploitation of our forests is
one of the best tools for preserving them" (FONAFIFO 2005).
Although carbon sequestration was a fundamental element of the new
ecosystem service payment program, other benefits such as biodiversity, water
quality, and scenic beauty were also built into the PSA program. These other
benefits could also be sold to international pharmaceutical firms, local water and
hydroelectric producers, and hotels and ecotourism groups.9 Nonetheless, Costa
Rican officials believed that international carbon market would be "the most
important potential financing instrument for environmental services" (de Camino
et al. 2000). To help jump-start the program, the Legislative Assembly also
established a 15 percent gas tax, one third of which was designated for
environmental services payments (Dutschke 2000; Salazar et al. 2000; UNFCCC
n.d.).
To broker and administer these payments, the forestry law created a new
entity, the National Forestry Financing Fund or FONAFIFO. 10 FONAFIFO's main
goal was to restore Costa Rica's forest cover as close to its original 70 percent
coverage as possible (FONAFIFO 2005). While this level appears high, studies
indicated that 60 percent of Costa Rica's land was best suited for forest. Of the
35 percent of land then in pasture, only eight percent was actually suitable for
9 The first environmental service payment in Costa Rica is believed to have occured in 1991, when the non-profit group
FUNDECOR paid farmers to exploit the scenic beauty of their landscape by building hiking trails through the property
(FONAFIFO 2005).
'O Fondo Nacional de Financiemiento Forestal or FONAFIFO was not a completely new entity. Existing grant programs
were financed through variety of forest Trust funds (340 in total) and managed by different entities. The creation of
FONAFIFO marked the consolidation of these funds into one package to be administed by one entity (FONAFIFO 2005).
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that use (Castro et al 2000). Increasing forest cover was the main objective of
the PSA program, but FONAFIFO was also supposed to meet social objectives.
In addition to the benefits of biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, and
carbon capture, FONAFIFO was to orient its program towards small and
medium-sized landowners to help them generate income (La Gaceta 1996).
In addition to the private forestry program, the environmental ministry
intended to sell carbon credits for the country's protected areas and buy up the
rights to lands identified in the GRUAS report (Castro et al. 2000; Pagiola 2006;
FONAFIFO 2005). The new law authorized government officials to expropriate
lands in exchange for just payment and prohibited tree cutting within national
forest boundaries and land-use changes without government permission (La
Gaceta 1996).
According to Costa Rican policymakers, the law represented a "new
paradigm for forest conservation" (FONAFIFO 2005). It was the first law to
correct for the "market failure to internalize the benefits of conservation.. .borne
by landowners, whether they are public entities such as the park service or
private ones, such as small farmers" (Castro et al 2000). The market-based
approach also allowed the policy to "transcend presidential terms" by making
conservation finance independent of politics (FONAFIFO 2005). Moreover, by
addressing the social, environmental and economics benefits of forests together
and combining both landowner payments with permanent parks consolidation,
the law represented a win-win situation for all stakeholders.
In addition to creating an ambitious set of forestry reforms, the Costa
Rican government found a way to address some of the major criticisms of joint
implementation. As noted earlier, many developing countries opposed joint
implementation because they feared foreign developers would create projects
that were not in the host country's national interests. The environmental service
program empowered FONAFIFO to develop local projects and transfer the
"certified tradable offsets" (CTOs) to the Ministry of Environment (MINAE), who
would sell them in bulk to developers. This mechanism had a three-fold purpose.
First, foreign investors now had a streamlined way to achieve emissions
reductions without the burden of developing the project in the foreign country
themselves. Second, the Costa Rican government could develop projects based
on its own sustainable development priorities, rather than those of foreign
developers. Third, the government could develop small projects on private lands,
package them together and sell the offsets in bulk (Castro et al. 2000; Salazar et
al. 2000). The latter provision addressed some foreign concerns about the cost-
effectiveness of small projects, which can have high transaction costs of
contracts, and domestic equity concerns about who would benefit from the
program. To reduce the risk of carbon forestry projects, the government
developed a reserve of carbon offsets (30 percent of all sales) in case a
landowner dropped out of the program, or a reforestation projects was
compromised (Castro et al. 2000).
Through the use of certified tradable offsets, Costa Rica became the first
developing country to design and implement an AIJ project on its own. In July
1996 the Norwegian government agreed to spend $2 million on 200,000 certified
tradable offsets for a 4000-hectare conservation project in the Virilla watershed.
The project embodied Costa Rica's aspirations for the carbon market. Located
near San Jose, the nation's capital, the Virilla watershed was highly
contaminated because of its proximity to industry in the nearby free trade zone.
In order to protect the watershed, Costa Rica used some of the Norwegian funds
to purchase 1000 hectares of primary forest for protection. FONAFIFO used the
remainder to pay landowners to abandon grazing, restore natural forests and
develop a small-scale commercial tree plantation (Subak 2000; Dutschke 2000).
The Virilla watershed purchase jump-started the private-incentive program
and raised Costa Rican expectations for the carbon market. Instead of
submitting individual forest projects in localized areas to the AIJ boards of
individual countries and waiting for buyers, as it had done with Virilla, Costa Rica
repackaged its two main programs-the consolidation of national parks and
private land forestry program-into two umbrella projects and placed them on the
Chicago Board of Trade stock exchange (Dutschke 2000; Roeder 1997). From
the perspective of the administration, placing the umbrella projects on the stock
exchange instead of looking for buyers for individual projects, would allow the
government to finance its forestry programs consistently, by making a constant
supply available for buyers (Castro et al 2000).
The Chicago Sun-Times reported that Costa Rica's carbon offsets would
be "the first tradable commodity of global benefit," and would generate tens of
billions of dollars to protect Costa Rican rainforests (Roeder 1997). The
530,000-hectare Protected Areas Project (PAP), which now included much of the
lands targeted for national park consolidation, including Biodiversifix, was
expected to generate between $150 to $300 million for the sequestration of 15
million tons of CO2 over 20 years. If used to finance the changes recommended
in the GRUAS report, this would be enough to protect 90 percent of Costa Rica's
biodiversity (UNFCCC 2008; Janzen 2008; Dutschke 2000; UNFCCC n.d.).
OCIC also planned on enrolling hectares on a rolling basis for lands under the
incentive program, which were listed under the Private Forestry Project (PFP). In
order to broker these sales, OCIC established an exclusive contract with the
Center for Financial Products to sell four billion tons of CTOs on the exchange
over 20 years, at a minimum price of $10 per ton of CO2 sequestered (Castro et
al. 2000).
Ultimately, five projects were listed for AIJ financing in Costa Rica. In
addition to the two listed on the Chicago Stock Exchange, the original Ecoland
and Carfix projects remained on the U.S. AIJ list. A large commercial developer
also submitted a 6,000-hectare commercial reforestation project known as Klinki
(Dutschke 2000; UNFCCC 1997). According to Tattenbach, this project was not
in line with Costa Rica's main goals for the carbon market-fusing forest
conservation and biodiversity protection with rural development (Vohringer 2004;
Dutschke 2000). Nevertheless, OCIC accepted the project to increase private
sector involvement in the carbon market. In total, these projects added up to
approximately 650,765 hectares of land and more than 105 million metric tons of
CO2 offsets (UNFCCC n.d.). Based on the floor price established by OCIC,
Costa Rica expected to generate more than a one billion dollars through joint
implementation.
The Battle for a Permanent Mechanism
While Costa Rica was positioning itself domestically to take advantage of AIJ, it
was also fighting a heated battle on the international front to secure the
permanency of carbon funding. Despite the launch of AIJ, developing countries
continued to fight against the inclusion of any flexibility mechanisms, including
joint implementation. Costa Rica was the first to break from the G-77 in support
of a permanent mechanism for joint implementation and maneuvered to build
support for this initiative.
Most environmental NGOs and developing countries believed that
industrialized countries needed to focus on emissions reductions within their
national boundaries. In 1995, at the COP1, Brazil put forth a proposal for the
creation of a punitive fund, into which Annex I countries would be forced to pay if
they failed to meet their emission reduction commitments. This money would be
invested in a Clean Development Fund, which developing countries could use for
sustainable development and adaptation projects. Although the first draft
proposal of the Kyoto Protocol excluded the Clean Development Fund, the G-77
rallied behind the idea of financial penalties and the text was reinserted in a
subsequent draft (Olsen 2005).
According to Cristiana Figueres, one of Costa Rica's climate change
negotiators, Costa Rica did not believe that developed countries would agree to
penalties and approached U.S. negotiators to develop a compromise. In
discussions with the U.S. negotiators, Figueres and others suggested
transforming the Brazilian concept of the Clean Development Fund into a positive
proposal that both developing and industrialized countries could agree on
(Figueres 2008). The final package, which became known as the Clean
Development Mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol, transformed the Brazilian idea of
a fund that penalizes Annex I countries for not complying into a mechanisms that
helps them comply."1
Agreement on the CDM was a breakthrough in the conflict between
developing and industrialized countries over global climate change. Known as
the "win-win mechanism" or the "bridge between North and South," the CDM
" Annex I countries who do not meet their commitments in the first compliance period are penalized from using the CDM
in future compliance periods, however.
allowed industrialized countries to reduce emissions in a cost-effective way and
helped poorer countries develop sustainably (Olsen 2005). In the eyes of the
Figueres administration, the agreement canonized the possibility of using carbon
financing for its own sustainable forestry reform.
Costa Rica Struggles to Get Financing for AIJ
Despite Costa Rica's domestic and international efforts, only two of the five listed
forestry projects, Ecoland and Norway, were actually financed through AIJ
(UNFCCC 2008). Only 2,500 hectares of parklands were purchased, compared
to the 530,000 hectares proposed (UNFCCC 2008). In addition, although Costa
Rica enrolled 200,000 hectares in the PSA program, only 4,000 were financed
through carbon sales (Pagiola 2002; UNFCCC 2008). Costa Rica had hoped to
generate one billion dollars and preserve 650,765 hectares through carbon sales,
but by the end of the AIJ period, it had generated only $2.95 million for 6,500
hectares (UNFCCC 2008). This figure is quite low given that 76 land-use and
forestry projects were transacted as part of AIJ, equivalent to 40 million tons of
CO 2. Twenty-one percent of all AIJ transactions during the period between 1996
and 2003 were forestry projects (Pearson et al. 2006).
Given Costa Rica's efforts to position itself as a leader in the AIJ process,
its inability to attract buyers is difficult to understand. First, Costa Rica may have
been overestimating the price of its CTOs and the size of the AIJ market.
Although the initial sale of Ecoland credits went for a mere $4.40 per metric ton
of CO2, the Norwegian investment equaled 2 million dollars ($10 per ton of CO2)
(Dutschke 2000). To reinforce the integrity of its credits and gain investment
support, OCIC hired an independent verifying organization, SGS Switzerland, to
reassess its initial estimations for the Private Area Project and Private Forestry
Project. After verification, OCIC raised the price to $20 per ton of CO2 (Dutschke
2000). This high price may have deterred other investors. Most forestry projects
during this time were going for between 50 cents and $5 per ton of CO2 (Miranda
et al. 2004). The Norwegian deal, as well as the subsequent assessment, may
have warped funding expectations for the program: the initial projection of
generating $150 to $300 million for the consolidation of national parks was based
on this price.
In any case, the market may not have been ready for the kind of large
projects that Costa Rica had assembled. Janzen had been in discussion with a
number of possible investors for Biodiversifix, but when it was incorporated into
the large Protected Areas Project, investors were concerned about where their
investments would be placed (Janzen 2008; Roeder 1997). Investors were
suspicious of the large size of these projects and their high estimated benefits.
Moreover, Costa Rica was the only country using financial markets to attract
investors. They based their model on the successful U.S. market for sulfur oxide
pollution, but trading carbon offsets was new to the U.S. market-and
furthermore was not required by regulation (Castro et al 2000). According to
Mark Wishnie, Director of Project Management for Equator Environmental, an
environmental brokerage firm, "Costa Rica was way out in front of everyone else.
They took action before markets were in place" (Wishnie 2008). The U.S.'s
decision to drop out of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 also may have hurt Costa
Rica's efforts to attract investors. Without even the threat of regulation, few
companies had an incentive to invest in carbon-offset projects.
In short, although it met few of its objectives, during the 1990s Costa Rica
positioned itself as a leader in carbon forestry projects and its innovations helped
shaped the new regulatory market. Not only did Costa Rican negotiators help
shape the CDM, the "certified tradable offsets" (CTOs) developed by
environmental officials became the building blocks for the emissions trading
system for the CDM. Instead of depending on private developers from Annex I
countries to design and implement projects within their borders, developing
countries could now create their own projects and sell the certified emissions
reductions (CERs)-a modified version of Costa Rican CTOs-to companies
with emission reduction commitments. In addition, Costa Rica's initiative to sell
CTOs on the stock exchange presaged the creation of a full-fledged carbon
emissions trading scheme. Ironically, Costa Rica had trouble taking advantage
of this new market that it had helped create.
FORESTRY AND THE CDM
Although Costa Rica reshaped its forestry policy to take advantage of
international carbon financing, decisions on the international level undermined
these efforts. Specifically, political bargaining by international negotiators-in
which developed countries justified their self-interested positions using science-
based arguments-resulted in the exclusion of avoided deforestation from the
CDM. The result: developed countries were allowed to get emissions credits for
land-use and forestry projects, whereas developing countries could only sell
credits for reforestation. This decision thwarted Costa Rica's aspiration to use
international carbon credits to consolidate its national park system and finance
conservation payments, forcing it to look for new sources of funding. Not only did
the rules of the CDM inadvertently penalize Costa Rica for its early attempts to
reduce deforestation, but the unitary focus on calculating net emissions
reductions and reducing scientific uncertainty, coupled with the high cost of
implementation, made it difficult for developing countries in general to implement
socially and ecologically responsible projects. Despite the weakness of the CDM,
FONAFIFO's newfound financial independence strengthened its ability to
develop projects that link carbon sequestration with other sustainable
development benefits. Yet this financial independence came at a price - the
abandonment of Costa Rica's efforts to consolidate the national park system.
Negotiating the Inclusion of Forests in the CDM
After reaching an agreement on the CDM in 1996, negotiators began to debate
whether or not to include natural sinks in the Kyoto Protocol. Natural sinks
consist of a variety of different activities such as forest conservation,
reforestation, and sustainable management of forests, crops, or grazing lands. In
the climate conventions, these are grouped together in a category known as
Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry or LULUCF. Annex I and non-Annex
I parties were divided about the inclusion of sinks. Forest conservation-known
as avoided deforestation or reducing emissions from deforestation and
degradation (REDD)-was particularly controversial. Although scientific
uncertainty in calculating carbon uptake from carbon forest projects was used to
justify the final decision, the negotiations ultimately came down to competing
national interests, alliance building, and the power dynamics between the parties.
This decision put a damper on Costa Rica's aspirations for using climate
financing to support its forestry reforms.
Scientists agree that forests, and other types of vegetation, serve as
natural sinks for greenhouse gases that account for more than 75 percent of the
carbon stored in the earth's ecosystem and 40 percent of the carbon exchanged
between the atmosphere and earth annually (Hamilton et al. 2002).12 According
'2 When plants undergo photosynthesis, they convert CO2 from the atmosphere and sunlight into energy and oxygen. As a
tree grows, most of the carbon that plants take in becomes part of the tree's biomass, its roots, trunk, branches and
leaves. A newly planted tree takes in a lot of carbon as it grows. Some of that carbon however goes back into the
atmosphere, when trees exhale CO2.at night. Moreover, when a tree dies or is cut down, the remaining biomass on the
forest floor decays and also releases CO2 into the atmosphere. While some carbon is stored in soils, a dying or cut down
tree is a net-emitter of CO02, compared to a live one that is a net CO02 sink. For this reason, most scientists agree that
to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), from 1895 to 1998, 50
percent of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions resulted from land-use
changes, mainly from deforestation (IPCC 2000). While this contribution has
decreased over the century, between 20 and 25 percent of anthropogenic CO2
emissions during the 1990s resulted from land-use changes, primarily tropical
deforestation-the second largest cause after fossil fuel combustion (IISD 2007).
Although the link between deforestation and climate is well established, at
the time of the negotiations scientists were uncertain about what the long-term
impact of climate change would be on the ability of forests to take up and store
carbon; scientists were also concerned about their ability to measure that uptake.
Early experiments indicated that elevated CO 2 levels could actually make trees
grow faster (Clark 2004). More recent studies, however, have shown mixed
results (Clark 2004; Feeling et al 2007).13 In addition to this uncertainty about the
effect of climate change on sequestration, the greenhouse gas emissions
reductions resulting from forest conservation and management projects are often
hard to quantify and verify, because of their vulnerability to human and natural
conserving and maintaining healthy forests is a natural way of storing carbon and deforestation is a major cause of
greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, planting new trees helps mitigate climate change, by creating new storehouses
for CO2.
'3 Studies on the impact of climate change on CO 2 absorption are mixed. Early studies showed that higher CO2 increased
growth, but a 2007 study on old growth forests in Panama and Malaysia indicated that growth was actually slowing down,
not accelerating in the last two decades (Feeley et al. 2007). Warmer temperatures and higher incidence of drought due
to global warming may also affect the ability of forests to absorb carbon (Clark 2004). Most recent studies show that
photosynthesis has a parabolic response to temperature: slight warming can help increase plants' metabolism up to a
point, after which plants take in less carbon, and respiration-the process by which plants exhale CO 2 at night-increases
exponentially. Scientists believe that this point of inversion is around 26"C to 340C, depending on the species. A study
of air temperature at the tropical forest research site in La Selva, Costa Rica, showed that air temperatures already were
between 300C to 37"C on 73 percent of the days (Clark et al. 2003). In addition, increased temperature is associated with
lower rainfall in tropical areas. Water stress is expected to decrease carbon intake in forests and increase forest mortality
(Clark 2004).
interventions, such as illegal logging and fires, and uncertainty about the amount
of carbon stored at a project level. For example, scientists were concerned that
forest conservation projects might divert logging to areas outside the project
area, a phenomenon known as leakage.
In the debate over the inclusion of sinks, countries joined forces based on
their common national self-interests and interpreted the available science in ways
that were consistent with these positions. The debate over sinks centered around
two issues. First, Annex I countries fought over the inclusion of land-use
activities in their baseline emissions levels and emissions reductions targets.
Second, countries debated whether land-use offset projects, such as forest
conservation, reforestation, and land management, should be eligible for CDM
financing. As most of Costa Rica's initiatives focused on avoiding deforestation
through consolidation of public lands and incentives to landowners, national
negotiators focused their efforts on including avoided deforestation in the CDM.
Forming the umbrella group, GRILA, Costa Rica in alliance with most Latin
American countries and some Annex I countries pushed for a broad definition of
the types of LULUCF allowed by the CDM (Boyd et al. 2004).14 As with AIJ, the
Annex I countries who supported an inclusive definition of land-use and forestry
activities were concerned about the cost-effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol. Like
Costa Rica, most Latin American countries, especially Bolivia and Colombia, saw
14 GRILA was composed of all Latin American countries except Brazil and Peru, and the U.S., Norway, Canada, and
Australia.
the potential to support forestry initiatives through the international climate
regime. For most Latin American and African countries, deforestation was their
major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions (Trexler et al. 2000; Masera and
Sheinbaum 2000). Forestry projects were not only more cost-effective than many
renewable energy projects, but were closely linked to rural development, a
domestic priority. By excluding avoided deforestation, they warned, the climate
regime would ignore a major contributor to climate change and inhibit the
sustainable development potential of the CDM (Boyd et al. 2004).
On the other side of the debate, the European Union, Russia, Brazil,
China, India, and AOSIS, the coalition of small island states, argued for the
exclusion of avoided deforestation (Olsen 2005). These parties argued that the
inclusion of land use and forestry offset projects under the CDM would create
"another big loophole in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol" (Boyd et al.
2004; Brown et al. 2002). They emphasized the scientific uncertainty about the
permanence of sink offsets which if measured inadequately or accidentally re-
emitted would open the "floodgates" to "fake credits" (Fearnside 2001; Figueres
2008; Backstrand and Lovbrand 2006; Brown et al. 2002).
Like the GRILA group, domestic political interests, rather than pure
science, shaped these parties positions. For example, the E.U. negotiators were
concerned that the inclusion of sinks in both the CDM and Annex I commitments
gave an advantage to the U.S., by decreasing its emission baseline and allowing
it to invest in cheap carbon credits from avoided deforestation instead of
reforming their own practices and raising energy prices (Fearnside 2001; Babiker
et al 2002).15 In 1991, one year before the UNFCCC, the E.U. had actually
supported a program to conserve Amazonian rainforests, acknowledging the
importance of the program to "reduce Brazilian rainforests' contribution to global
carbon emissions" (Fearnside 2001). The E.U. had reversed this position
because it believed that by excluding forests in CDM, the U.S. would be forced to
raise the price of fossil fuels through a carbon tax; the higher energy price would
lessen the US's comparative trade advantage (Fearnside 2001). Similarly,
Brazil maintained a contradictory stance on the inclusion of sinks, supporting the
inclusion of reforestation projects but opposing avoided deforestation. Many
theorize that Brazil feared that the inclusion of avoided deforestation would
threaten their sovereignty over land use decisions in the Amazon, while
reforestation credits could be used to support their growing commercial
plantation business (Fearnside 2001).
From 1997 to 2001, the parties fought over the inclusion of land-use
activities in the CDM. In July 2001, the U.S. officially dropped out of the
negotiations fundamentally changing the power dynamics in the negotiations.
'" Setting baselines is always controversial, as they establish the standard against which all future reforms are measured.
By including LULUCF activities in Annex I baselines and in later emissions reductions, the U.S. could argue that its
emissions footprint was actually lower than when only energy emissions were considered, and that over the course of the
1990s it had reduced its carbon footprint substantially through changes in land management and reforestation activities.
In addition, if LULUCF was included in the CDM, the U.S. could continue to burn fossil fuels and buy up cheap credits for
forestry activities from developing countries. The E.U. feared that both the inclusion of LULUCF in Annex I baselines and
obligations and in the CDM would ease the U.S.'s obligation to reduce emissions from energy use and thus raise energy
prices. Energy prices are much higher in the EU, which places them at a disadvantage in competing for international
industrial markets.
According to Article 25, the Kyoto Protocol only enters into force after Annex I
countries responsible for 55 percent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for
1990 sign the treaty. This provision was intended to ensure that large emitters
become part of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to make a meaningful impact on
addressing climate change. When the U.S. dropped out of the negotiations,
however, this provision gave Japan, Russia, Canada, and Australia significant
power to demand the inclusion of sinks in Annex I baselines and commitments.16
In order to garner these countries' support, the E.U. agreed to allow Annex I
parties to determine for themselves what part of their baseline and commitments
could come from sinks (H6hne et al. 2007; Bettelheim and D'Origny 2003). In
exchange, these developed parties agreed to restrict the scope of sinks in the
CDM (Bettelheim and D'Origny 2003).
This compromise shaped the outcome of the debate over the CDM.
Although Costa Rican negotiators tried to demonstrate the use of techniques to
reduce scientific uncertainty about the permanence of natural sinks, after the
U.S. dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Costa Rica lost its strongest
ally in the debate. Moreover, Brazil continued to maintain a strong stance
against the inclusion of avoided deforestation. According to Cristiana Figueres,
Brazil's continued opposition divided the G-77 and ultimately led to the exclusion
of forest conservation for developing countries (Figueres 2008).
"6 The E.U. essentially had to compromise on many of its early demands in order to get the treaty ratified by the required
number of parties.
In their final decision, outlined in the 2001 Marrakesh Accords, parties
agreed to allow only reforestation and afforestation (reforestation on lands which
were not previously forested) in the CDM for the first commitment period from
2008-2012.17 This meant that only new tree plantings activities could be counted
towards Annex I countries' emission reductions credits through the CDM. In
addition, these credits could only make up one percent of Annex I countries'
emissions reductions. In contrast, parties agreed to include land-use activities
such as forest, cropland and grazing-land management in Annex I countries
baselines and project activities (Boyd et al. 2004; H6hne et al. 2007). In fact,
Annex I countries could jointly implement forestry and land-use projects with
other developed countries, where emissions were less costly. For example,
France could implement a forest management project in Romania and receive
the credits.
The Marrakesh Accords thus allowed industrialized countries to count
land-use activities towards their emissions credits, as long as they did not come
from developing countries.18 Reforestation credits from developing countries
were further discouraged through the one percent limit. The Prime Minister of
Papua New Guinea, a South Pacific rainforest state, highlighted the inequity of
the decision:
"7 Although the COP6 began in November 2000, disagreements over LULUCF caused the conference to be adjourned
without an agreement. The negotiations resumed in November 2001, which is referred to as COP6-bis (Hohne et al
2007).
8 In fact, Joint Implementation allowed Annex I countries to implement forestry and land-use projects with other
developed countries, where emissions were less costly (i.e. France could implement a project in Romania) and receive
the credits.
The Kyoto Protocol specifically provides incentives for industrialized
countries to reduce deforestation. However, for developing
countries, the Marrakesh Accords have subsequently slammed that
door shut. Developing Nations are again exploited and effectively
forced to conserve the remaining Rainforests for FREE! This defies
justice! More importantly, history shows it will not work! (Somare
2005).
Many scientists agreed with Prime Minister Somare. They noted that the
scientific uncertainty about avoided deforestation could easily be dealt with by
monitoring national inventories of forests within developing countries, and
through a host of other measures which would be required for reforestation
credits anyway (Swingland 2003; Fearnside 2001; Boyd et al. 2004). According
to Philip M. Fearnside, a tropical forest ecologists, the decision to exclude
reforestation was not scientific but moral: "Science can provide answers such as
'how much carbon will a given project hold out of the atmosphere, for how long
and with what degree. It cannot tell us whether that answer means that the CDM
should include or exclude avoided deforestation. Such a conclusion requires
moral choices" (Fearnside 2001).
In fact, these choices were not moral, but rather based on competing
domestic political interests. Their moral consequences however highlight the
shift in the power dynamics and alliances after the U.S. dropped out in 2001.
In Costa Rica, the decision to exclude avoided deforestation, coupled with
the failure to secure financing during AIJ for the Protected Areas Project,
precluded the government's plan to finance its two programs-the ecosystem
service payments and national park consolidation-through the international
climate system. Most Costa Rican initiatives were focused on forest
conservation. Of the five AIJ projects, four include conservation as a large
portion of emission credits, including the two that had already been financed
(UNFCCC n.d.). Most of the areas targeted by the GRUAS report for national
park consolidation were already forested. Even the incentive program appeared
to favor conservation over reforestation. The 1996 Forestry Law had established
fixed payments for different forestry activities. FONAFIFO paid landowners to
conserve forests $43 per hectare per year over a five year period, compared to
$27.25 per year over a 20 year period for commercial reforestation (Pagiola
2006). By the end of 2001, 82.5 percent of the 200,000 hectares financed
through the PSA were for conservation and 10.2 percent for forest management,
both now excluded under the CDM. Only 7 percent of the contracts were
reforestation for commercial purposes (Pagiola 2002).
Adapting to the Decision: New Funding and Reforms
Moving forward, Costa Rica looked for new sources of financing for its
conservation efforts and tried to create a demand for reforestation credits in order
to take advantage of the CDM. This new funding helped strengthened Costa
Rica's landowner incentive program and FONAFIFO's administrative and
technological capabilities - reforms that would help Costa Rica tackle the
requirements of the CDM. In the process of this strengthening, however, the
Costa Rican government abandoned its efforts to consolidate the national park
system.
From 1996 to 1998, the $2 million from the certified tradable offsets (CTO)
sales to Norway was used to cover the first environmental service payments
made in Costa Rica. Although the 1996 Forestry Law allocated one-third of the
15 percent tax on gasoline to the environmental service payment program, a sum
equivalent to $25 million during its first 15 months of its initiation, conflicts
between the ministry of finance and FONAFIFO during the Miguel Angel
Rodriguez administration impeded the distribution of these funds (de Camino et
al. 2000). In July 1997 private forestry groups threatened to block the inter-
American highway as a show of solidarity to FONAFIFO (FONAFIFO 2005).
After extensive negotiations, the Ministry of Finance agreed to allot $6.5 million to
the program, and in 2000 the Legislative Assembly agreed that 3.5 percent of the
future proceeds from the gas tax would go to FONAFIFO. Generating an
average of $10 million dollars annually, the gas tax would provide the bulk of
FONAFIFO's financing over the years and allowed it to continue the activities
outlined by the early reformers (Pagiola 2006).
After securing payments from the gas tax, FONAFIFO also began to
investigate international sources of funding to support its forestry initiatives. The
World Bank had always favored FONAFIFO's market-based approach to
conservation. In a series of reports from 1993 to 2000, World Bank scholars had
helped Costa Rica estimate the value of its environmental services, which helped
form the basis of the PSA program. Even though Costa Rica had been
enthusiastic about the potential for international carbon financing based on this
1993 World Bank report, more recently Bank officials had encouraged Costa
Rican officials to diversify their sources of financing, given the uncertainty
surrounding the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol. They called on FONAFIFO to
identify local consumers of environmental services, such as hydroelectric plants
and tourist facilities, and focus on creating markets domestically (de Camino et
al. 2000). To help support this initiative, in 2000 the World Bank agreed to loan
FONAFIFO $32.6 million. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) tacked on an
$8 million grant that targeted private lands adjacent to both national parks and
biological reserves in the Mesoamerican Biological Corridor that connects
Panama and Costa Rica (World Bank 2000).
The goal of the Ecomarkets loan and grant was to help Costa Rica meet
its commitments to private landowners for environmental services payments
while the government looked for long-term financing mechanisms for the
program. In addition, the loan could be used to help develop the technical and
administrative capacity of the environmental service payment program. Costa
Rica used these funds to help improve the outreach and scope of the PSA
program.
Studies of the early landowner program indicated that FONAFIFO was not
meeting many of its social and environmental goals. For example, in her study of
the Norwegian financed AIJ project, Susan Subak noted that conservation
payments had contributed little to either equity or biodiversity. Most payments
had gone to large wealthy property owners; lands remained degraded and only
red alder, a species with few wildlife benefits had been extensively planted
(Subak 2000).
To increase poor landowner participation, FONAFIFO created a global
contracting system that enables groups of small landowners to join the program
under one user agreement. This system defrays the cost of enrollment and
verification. FONAFIFO also simplified enrollment requirements to allow
untenured farmers to receive payments (FONAFIFO 2005; Pagiola 2006).
Administrative changes helped bolster these equity measures. In 2003,
FONAFIFO created eight regional offices to increase its outreach to landowners.
Previously, it had depended on the national conservation system and local
organizations to contract new enrollees. The new decentralized system allowed
FONAFIFO to maintain a tighter control over resources. Staffed with local
forestry officials, known as regentes, these new regional offices conducted
outreach, helped landowners develop land use plans, and verified activities on
the ground.
FONAFIFO also expanded its technological resources to help address the
ecological shortcomings of the program. In 1996, using some of the Norwegian
funds, Costa Rica had developed a series of "striptease" maps showing changes
in land cover over the course of the century. This baseline data and the GRUAS
report allowed FONAFIFO to identify priority areas for biodiversity, watershed,
and scenic beauty that were deforested or unprotected (FONAFIFO 2005).
FONAFIFO also developed a tree database, which allowed local offices to chose
from thousands of species in their bioregions and find local suppliers (Herrera
Ugalde 2008). These efforts helped FONAFIFO improve its outreach; however,
the 1996 law required the agency to enroll landowners on a first-come-first-
served basis, not based on the quality of the land, as an equity measure to
prevent preferential treatment (Pagiola 2006).19 Nonetheless, these reforms
-the decentralized verification system, maps and database- built up
FONAFIFO's technological and administrative capacities and gave Costa Rica an
advantage over many developing countries in meeting the CDM requirements.
In addition to these reforms, FONAFIFO looked to develop domestic
markets for ecosystem services. Using the certified tradable offset (CTO)
'9 This rule was likely a political decision to get approval from different legislators and interest groups.
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model, FONAFIFO created a uniform certification system for environmental
service payments for voluntary service agreements. Instead of buying carbon
offsets, however, companies that purchase Certified Environmental Services
(CSAs) agree to pay not just for the price of carbon or other services but for the
full cost of environmental service payments corresponding to one hectare of
conservation, reforestation or management in a specified area (Pagiola 2006).20
At the time, these CSAs and the CDM remained the centerpieces for
FONAFIFO's strategy to finance its environmental services program.
The World Bank loan helped sustain and improve Costa Rica's landowner
conservation payments at a critical time for Costa Rican environmental
advocates. The exclusion of avoided deforestation had almost bankrupted the
reforms made in the 1990s. Moreover, in 1998 the Social Christian Party
(PUSC) won the national elections, removing Figueres's National Liberation
Party (PLN) from power. Most of the environmental advocates who had played
an important role shaping the 1996 Forestry Law, such as Janzen, Tattenbach
and Castro, lost the ear of the government. Yet the PSA program was able to
survive because of its new sources of funding. Paradoxically, however, the
World Bank loan, coupled with the exclusion of avoided deforestation, limited the
original scope of Costa Rica's forestry reforms by influencing the new
government to abandon the efforts to consolidate the national park system due to
20 CSA stands for Certificado de Sevicio Ambientale.
lack of financing. In fact, since 2000 the Costa Rican government has focused
solely on enhancing the incentive program (Janzen 2008).
Costa Rica Prepares for the CDM
In addition to these general reforms financed through the World Bank loan,
FONAFIFO also tried to increase demand for reforestation incentives in order to
take advantage of the CDM. Although it was disappointed about the exclusion of
avoided deforestation in the international mechanism, FONAFIFO nevertheless
hoped to use the CDM to increase to the country's forest cover to its 70 percent
goal. Reforestation had always been part of Costa Rica's sustainable forestry
strategy; until 2003, however, reforestation incentives had mainly been focused
on commercial wood production. Commercial production incentives helped meet
the local demand for wood, prevent illegal deforestation, and provide income to
small and medium sized landowners. It was also supported politically by the
country's commercial sector.
Those receiving reforestation payments had mixed feelings about the
incentive program, however. A 2004 survey of landowner satisfaction in the
region of Huetar del Norte found that reforestation payment barely allowed
recipients to survive. Almost all of the proceeds were used for start-up and
compliance costs. Timber sales from thinning and final harvest were sufficient to
meet landowners' long-term needs. To be financially viable in the interim,
however, reforestation had to be combined with other income-generating
activities, such as cattle raising and agriculture (Miranda et al. 2004).
FONAFIFO tried to address landowners' concerns by introducing new
activities and raising incentive payments. In 2006 the Legislative Assembly
agreed to increase payments from $550 per hectare distributed over five years to
$816 distributed over 10 years. As landowners were required to maintain trees
for a total of 20 years, either by planting new ones or waiting to harvest them, this
net increase amounted to $13 per year. In order to help support farmers and
attract new landowners to the program, FONAFIFO introduced two new
payments: agroforestry as an additional income generating activity and natural
regeneration, which is less costly and time consuming to implement (Pagiola
2006). In addition, it launched a number of pilot projects to test their feasibility.21
Building on these reforms, in 2005 Costa Rica submitted CoopeAgri, its
first project, to the CDM Executive Board. It is a large-scale project, based on
small 60-hectare parcels from over 600 landowners, most of who have been
involved in ranching and agriculture. It addresses equity goals by providing long-
term livelihoods through agroforestry and commercial non-native species
21 A notable example is the pilot agroforestry carbon project in the indigenous territories of Bribri and Cabecar tribes.
FONAFIFO had originally enrolled individual tribal members. After it raised concerns about corruption and land
ownership, however, it began to work exclusively with the communal development organizations, ADITICA and ADITIBRI.
These tribal associations identify priority lands that met their collective goals and distribute profits based on consensus
decision of the association. In addition, part of the payments are used to create a sustainable development fund for
future projects (Rojas et al. 2007). ADITICA and ADITIBRI agreed to engage in a carbon forestry pilot to gauge interest in
using carbon payments as part of their rural development strategy. CATIE, a tropical research center, held meetings to
help tribal members understand the dynamics of carbon sequestration. It trained indigenous farmers to monitor tree
growth and carbon capture. The agroforestry project also shelters organic cacao plantations, as part of the broader rural
development strategy. Through this partnership, FONAFIFO has financed the restoration of 16,700 hectares of forest and
the planting of 118,000 trees for agroforestry (Rojas et al. 2007; Sheck 2006).
reforestation. It addresses environmental goals through natural regeneration in
an area with high erosion attached to a watershed, replacing illegal logging of
natural forests (The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit 2008). In 2004 the World
Bank selected CoopeAgri as one of the 20 projects eligible for funding for its
Biocarbon fund, a pilot fund to boost CDM forestry projects. The fund both
provided Costa Rica with start up capital and technical assistance to meet the
CDM standard and guaranteed to buy all of the carbon credits for the project at
the fixed price of $2.207 million (The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit 2008).
The only requirement was that the CDM Executive Board had to approve and
register the project (Herrera Ugalde 2008). Although this appeared simple,
registering CoopeAgri proved to be more difficult than Costa Rica anticipated.
The Rules of the CDM: Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty
Although the CDM was intended to link climate change with sustainable
development, the long and technical process focuses solely on incremental
carbon uptake. These rules--the creation of baseline dates, proof of
additionality, leakage prevention, and temporary crediting system--were
developed to ensure that the climate development mechanism contributed to the
goal of the Kyoto Protocol through a net reduction in greenhouse gas
accumulation. Scientists in collaboration with policymakers created the rules to
address concerns about scientific uncertainty and ensure that moneys invested
would not be wasted. Unintentionally, however, this focus on minimizing
uncertainty makes it difficult for developing countries to use the mechanism to
finance their sustainable forestry reforms.
To get a project registered and approved, a project developer first submits
a short project idea notice (PIN) to the CDM Executive Board that describes the
project and shows that the host country has agreed to the project. Using an
approved or new methodology, the developer must then complete a technical
submission, which outlines how the project expects to reduce emission. An
external verifier, called the Designated Operational Entity, reviews the project
and submits its recommendations to the Executive Board, which either agrees to
register it or not. Once registered, projects compete for buyers from
industrialized countries, who purchase the carbon credits for a negotiated price to
meet their emissions commitments. This process usually takes between four
months and two years (Pearson et al. 2006; CATIE 2007).
The actual language of the Kyoto Protocol on the CDM is quite vague
about the requirements of projects: emissions reductions must be "real,
measurable, and long term" and "additional to any that would otherwise have
occurred" (Article 12). But, CDM rules are quite specific about methods of
calculating emissions, proving additionality, and ensuring longevity. To qualify as
a carbon offset, projects must demonstrate that emissions will be lower than
under a business-as-usual scenario. This proof of "additionality" ensures the
environmental integrity of the mechanism, by guaranteeing that projects financed
through the CDM actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In order to show
additionality, project developers must establish a baseline scenario, which is
used to compare the greenhouse gas emissions from the land use before and
after a project is implemented. Higher emission baselines typically mean that a
project will generate less carbon credits. For example, a cleared area that has
been used for cattle production has a higher emission baseline, than one used
for planting crops. Similarly, projects that use fast-growing species, like
eucalyptus, are likely to generate more carbon credits, than native forests with
slower-growing species.
Although this method of calculating emissions baselines is meant to
ensure that CDM financed projects actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it
also creates a perverse incentive to cut down existing forests and replace them
with non-natives. In order to prevent this, parties agreed to a baseline date of
December 31, 1989, the date from which Annex I countries commitments are
calculated. Areas deforested after this date are not eligible to be CDM projects
(Boyd et al. 2004; H6hne et al. 2007).
In addition, the agencies in charge of developing CDM guidelines for
afforestation and reforestation projects also developed a number of
supplementary guidelines to ensure that funds would not go to projects that
would have occurred without CDM financing.22 Project developers must
demonstrate that reforestation was not already a financially attractive course of
action at the time when the project started. This proof of "financial additional"
had already been adopted for energy projects and is common for environmental
aid, as donors want to ensure that their funds are not being wasted on projects
that would have already occurred (Keohane 1996). Similarly, existing national
and sectoral policies that may affect land-use decisions also must be taken into
account. Curiously, instead of selecting the same year as the ones chosen for
eligible lands, the A/R CDM Working Group decided that the date for national
policies to be considered should be November 11, 2001, the year that parties
agreed to include reforestation and afforestation in the CDM (Pearson et al.
2006; CDM Working Group 2003). This meant that for every project countries
had to prove that forest policies implemented before November 11, 2001 did not
positively influence reforestation (CDM Working Group 2003).23
To address scientific concerns about the long-term benefits of natural
sinks, scientists and policymakers developed strategies to prevent leakage and
ensure permanence. Leakage occurs when events outside a project boundary
affect the net carbon reduction. For example, negative leakage can result when
reforesting one hectare of land diverts illegal logging to other areas of the forest.
22 The two main groups in charge of shaping and reforming the CDM reforestation guidelines are the Subsidiary Body for
Science and Technical Advice (SBSTA) and the Afforestation/Reforestation (AIR) CDM Working Group.
23 The CDM ruling actually states that policies instituted after November 11, 2001 shall not be considered in baseline
scenarios. "National and/or sectoral land-use policies or regulations, which give comparative advantages to
afforestation/reforestation activities and that have been implemented since the adoption by the COP of the CDM M&P
(decision 17/CP.7, 11 November 2001), need not be taken into account in developing a baseline scenario."
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Positive leakage occurs when areas outside the project boundaries switch to
forests. In order to prevent leakage, parties are supposed to develop national
policies to prevent displacement of deforestation. In the negotiations leading to
the formation of the rules, Latin American countries pushed to allow for positive
leakage to count towards their emissions credits, but this proposal was rejected
(H6hne et al. 2007).
Because scientists believe that trees do not store carbon permanently, the
A/R CDM Working Group also created two new categories of carbon crediting for
forestry projects: temporary Certified Emissions Reductions (t-CERs) and long
term Certified Emissions Reductions (I-CERs). Unlike energy credits, which
count as permanent emissions reductions, t-CERs and I-CERs expire, and
therefore only delay the need to reduce emissions. After the project expires,
buyers need to replace them with new temporary credits, permanent credits
(CERs) from energy projects, or their own emissions reductions; otherwise the
emissions will be counted against them. Furthermore, emissions reductions of
reforestation projects must be verified more frequently than those for energy
(every five years, compared to every 10 years for energy projects).
Latin American countries opposed this system of accounting. Colombia
submitted a proposal that would make the credits temporary only if the project
area was deforested. To help build consensus, Canada proposed that all CDM
approved projects become protected areas, thus guaranteeing permanency of
tree plantings. Both of these proposals were rejected in favor of temporary
credits. Although this system of crediting ensures that emissions are reduced in
the long term, it also means that the market value of forestry credits is lower than
that of energy projects because they are temporary, and that the liability for
guaranteeing credits rests on developing countries (Pearson et al 2006; Boyd et
al 2004). For example, buyers of t-CERs are only contractually obliged to
provide financing for five years, after which they can choose to renew the
transaction. If they do not, however, the project developer, which is typically in
the developing country, must find a new buyer. While buyers of I-CERs are
contractually obliged to make payments for 20 years, if the carbon generated is
lower than expected, the project developer in the developing country must
replace the difference through credits that are banked as liability payments
(CATIE 2007; Pearson et al. 2006).
Costa Rica Tries to Meet the CDM Requirements
By focusing principally on calculating incremental carbon uptake and minimizing
uncertainty, the CDM rules make it difficult for developing countries to participate
in the regime. One of the main reasons for this difficulty is that developing
countries lack the technical and administrative capacity to participate effectively
in the regime. This was not the case for Costa Rica. Although one would expect
Costa Rica to have an advantage at meeting CDM requirements due to its
developed conservation bureaucracy and increase in forest cover, the rules of
CDM unintentionally penalize Costa Rica for its early reforms.
By the time the CDM rules were in place in 2005, Costa Rica already had
developed institutions, inventories, and procedures that helped it meet the
complex requirements of the CDM. While many developing countries protested
the restriction on reforestation for lands deforested before 1990 because they
had not inventoried their land, Costa Rica's land-cover tracking system allowed
FONAFIFO to identify 1.1 million hectares of potential lands eligible under the
CDM and to develop several projects for CDM consideration (Pagiola 2006).
Working with local universities, FONAFIFO was expanding the carbon
sequestration data for species in its tree database (Herrera Ugalde 2008).
Moreover, FONAFIFO already had a system of verification, permanence, and
leakage prevention in place. It had a trained workforce of forestry officials who
verified tree growth and cover on private lands. FONAFIFO's incentive contracts
had always required landowners to implement sustainable forest management
plans, such as instituting fire breaks and preventing illegal logging, which help
ensure the permanence of planted trees. The 1996 law's prohibition on land-use
changes in forested areas and satellite monitoring helped prevent leakage as
well. Given that these practices and institutions already existed, the need for
learning and the cost of compliance with CDM rules was smaller for Costa Rica
than for other countries that did not have existing programs.
On the other hand, Costa Rica's advantages were counterbalanced by the
rules for proving additionality. Because it had passed its national forestry policy
during AIJ and not after the agreement on sinks, Costa Rican officials had to
prove that its earlier reforms, particularly the PSA program and prohibition on
land-use changes, did not give " a comparative advantage to afforestation/
reforestation activities" (CDM Working Group 2003). FONAFIFO had intended to
sell carbon credits for existing projects that had been reforested through the
private landowner program. It assumed it could pay landowners first and then
sell the carbon credits retroactively. But the CDM's choice of dates and proof of
financial additionality prohibited such retroactive payments (Pagiola 2006;
Tattenbach 2008).
Moreover, the rules of the private landowner program made it difficult to
show financial additionality (Tattenbach 2008). The 1996 Forestry Law requires
FONAFIFO to pay landowner the same fixed sum for reforestation and
conservation, regardless of the value of the land, its biological importance, or any
other factor. This makes it difficult to attract landowners who engage in activities
that have higher revenues than the payment and attracts those engaged in
activities with a lower opportunity costs and those that are unprofitable. For
example, in the Virilla region, where the Norway AIJ project is located,
FONAFIFO struggled to enroll dairy farmers compared to export meat producers
because the dairy cooperatives were doing very well, while international meat
prices had dropped (Subak 2000). In the latter case, FONAFIFO had a hard time
proving that the PSA payments directly influenced landowners to reforest an
area, since their alternative was unprofitable to begin with.
Some studies have found direct links between the landowner payments
and reforestation, but others conclude that the payments go to support activities
that would have occurred without the financial incentive. A study in the Central
Volcanic Region by Tattenbach, the former head of OCIC, claims that the private
landowner program is responsible for a 10 percent increase in forest cover
(Tattenbach et al. 2006). In a 2004 landowner survey, 43 percent of those
enrolled in the PSA program claimed that they had abandoned agriculture and
pasture when incentive was offered as an option (Sierra and Russman 2006).
Moreover, Tattenbach points out that many areas adjacent to landowners
enrolled in the program also increased their forest cover (Tattenbach et al. 2006).
He argues that these landowners shifted activities early in anticipation of
receiving conservation payments in the future. In their country-wide study of the
ecosystem service payment program, however, Pfaff and Robalino argue that the
program actually subsidizes activities in areas that would likely have been
reforested and conserved without the funding, because the 1996 Forest Law
prohibited land-use changes in forested areas, and pasture and agriculture have
become less profitable (Pfaff et al. 2007). They point to these conversions
without payments as evidence that the PSA has little impact on landowner
decisions to convert lands. In short, because of existing laws, economic changes
in land values, and the fixed nature of the PSA payments, Costa Rica has a hard
time proving that landowners would not have reforested their areas without the
incentive.
Interestingly, despite disagreements over how it has happened, all of
these studies indicate that Costa Rica has been increasing its forest cover and
decreasing deforestation. Ironically, though, the rules of CDM do not reward
Costa Rica for increasing its forest cover. Instead they penalize the country for
not being able to prove that the 1996 Forest Policy did not influence the change
and that the PSA payments did not directly stimulate the reforestation. Given
that the CDM is intended to help address climate change, judging Costa Rican
projects based on an arbitrary historical baseline and financial additionality
appear somewhat trivial.
In fact, in June 2007 the CDM Executive Board rejected the original
methodology used for Coopeagri for the third time, mainly for technical errors in
setting baselines, calculating net carbon benefits, and proving additionality (A/R
Working Group 2006; Herrera Ugalde 2008). This decision forced Costa Rica to
reformulate its entire 300-page Project Proposal and resubmit it to the CDM
Executive Board. Making matters worse, Costa Rica had already used the same
methodology to calculate emissions for two other projects, which it would have to
redo. Although FONAFIFO is contractually obliged to resubmit Coopeagri, it is
now considering launching its other projects on the international voluntary
market, which uses a less rigid definition of additionality, rather than through the
CDM (Herrera Ugalde 2008).
CDM: An Unintentional Barrier to Sustainable Development
The CDM's inadvertent penalization for early reforms reflects a conflict between
the CDM rules and the goals of forest advocates in developing countries.
Although the CDM is supposed to help developed countries meet their Kyoto
commitments in a cost-effective way and developing countries develop
sustainably in tandem, the rules of the CDM favor the interests of developed
countries. Not only is it more difficult for developing countries to implement offset
projects than developed countries, but the weak mechanism also creates a
disincentive for countries to link climate change with sustainable development.
The main objective of the CDM is to contribute to a net reduction in
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere by helping developed countries achieve
their Kyoto Protocol commitments in a cost-effective way. In addition, the CDM
is supposed to help non-Annex I parties develop sustainably. While the
mechanism is supposed to meet these goals in tandem, the guidelines for
scenario baselines, national policies, financial additionality, and impermanence
were designed solely to ensure that funding stimulates projects that have a net
effect on greenhouse gas accumulation. But forest advocates are interested in
other benefits of increasing forest cover, such as protecting biodiversity,
improving water quality, and alleviating poverty by generating income-all of
which are closely tied to promoting sustainable development in developing
countries. Their priority is to support projects that combine these benefits,
regardless of when and how they arose.
The conflict between carbon storage and sustainable development was
caused in part by a decision made during the international negotiations. The G-
77, including Costa Rica, fought hard against requiring a socioeconomic and
environmental assessment to judge the benefits of forestry projects because it
would limit their sovereignty (Boyd et al. 2004). Instead, the CDM leaves it up to
the host party to decide whether a project actually contributes to its sustainable
development. Because of this decision, the CDM approves forestry projects
based solely on carbon sequestration, and the market value of carbon forestry
projects is based solely on capture.
In addition, the scientific uncertainty underpinning the negotiations
influenced scientists and policymakers to shape and enforce policies that would
guarantee the integrity of the mechanism. Because developing countries do not
have emissions targets of their own, the CDM functions solely as a mechanism
by which developed can finance projects in developing countries that reduce
emissions. Although the baseline dates chosen are somewhat arbitrarily,
scientists who validate CDM applications focus on measuring net increases in
sequestration from a historical baseline. Their priority is not to examine general
reforestation trends in a country but rather to make sure that the money invested
in developing countries is the principal impetus for reforestation.
Scientific uncertainty is clearly not the only driver, however, because many
of the CDM provisions are much more complicated than those laid out for Joint
Implementation between developed countries. Not only can developed countries
implement a wider range of forest and land-use projects jointly, but they do not
have to submit a project design document to a central entity or get projects
validated and registered with one. Moreover, they did not have to take into
account national policies or use a temporary crediting system (Bettelheim and
D'Origny 2003). The end result is that it is actually more difficult, costly and time
consuming to submit a project to the CDM than to develop forestry projects jointly
in developed countries.
This added complexity of the CDM compared to Joint Implementation
between developed countries highlights the extent to which science has been
used as a foil for countries' political interests in the creation of incentives for
forestry in the Kyoto Protocol. According to Bettelheim and D'Origny, in the
intense effort to reach an agreement over the Protocol, negotiators forgot that
"climate does not care where or how atmospheric concentration of CO2 are
reduced" and created rules that made the value of forestry offsets lower in
developing countries (Bettelheim and D'Origny 2003).
The complexity of the CDM rules and process, coupled with the sole focus
on carbon capture, detracts both from the goals of forest advocates and the goal
of promoting sustainable development. In Costa Rica's case, the arbitrary dates
mean that the CDM does not count the global benefit of Costa Rica's early
action. Although Costa Rica has increased its forest cover, it struggles to prove
that the CDM funds directly stimulated this change.
Although the CDM rules have a uniquely bad effect on Costa Rica, they
have more general impacts on developing countries and the types of projects
they create. First, the long, centralized process and high cost of CDM verification
and approval-estimated at between $30,000 and $100,000-may dissuade
developing countries from participating in the CDM. Because these upfront
costs are not reimbursed, if the project is rejected, developing countries take on a
large financial risk in creating a CDM project (Anonymous 2007; Pearson et al.
2006).24 Second, those who do submit projects have an incentive to cut out
other social and environmental benefits in order to maximize sequestration and
cost-effectiveness. Because the CDM only places a value on carbon capture,
other ecosystem and social services are not valued in the price of carbon offsets
and are often perceived as expendable. Project developers have an incentive to
keep costs down in order to compete for buyers on the CDM market. Low-cost
credits typically win out, given that most investors are more concerned with
24 The CDM Executive Board is also underfinanced. This is one of the sources of the long waiting periods.
compliance than promoting sustainable development. For example, landfill
methane capture projects are the most popular CDM energy projects because
they generate many offsets at a low cost; however, they do little to promote
economic development and have few local environmental benefits for the host
country (Olsen 2005; Point Carbon 2008). The temporary nature of forestry
credits also means that the offering price and demand are lower for forestry
offsets (Olsen 2005).
In addition to these financial deterrents, the rules of the CDM may actually
promote forestry projects that are not sustainable in the long run. For example,
the focus on carbon quantification provides a perverse incentive to plant fast-
growing commercial species in order to maximize the net carbon capture (Subak
2000; Olsen 2005). In fact, the only CDM reforestation project approved to date
uses eucalyptus as a renewable source for paper production in China (UNFCCC
2008). The absence of carbon-uptake data for many native species results in
forestry projects that are less diverse than natural forests. Non-tenured farmers
cannot participate in the program, due to CDM concerns about permanence
(Herrera Ugalde 2008). Small-scale projects, in which low income communities
are more likely to participate, are prohibitively expensive to administer (Locatelli
and Pedroni 2006).
For example, in a long-term study of a carbon-forestry program in
Chiapas, Mexico, researchers found that the original goals of community
development, biodiversity protection, and carbon sequestration were decoupled
over time. Initially, the community-based agroforestry program used a variety of
species and had distributed power between researchers and farmers. But within
three years, the program had become focused on generating revenue from
carbon sequestration. Those who sold the carbon on the international market
became the sole decision makers, and species diversity was reduced to two fast-
growing species (Nelson and de Jong 2003).
Evaluating Costa Rica's CDM Projects
Despite the general push for low-cost projects, an evaluation of the Costa Rican
projects proposed for CDM suggests that the country has not compromised the
ecological and social goals of its PSA program. In fact, FONAFIFO's institutional
structure and financial independence enable Costa Rica to implement projects
that benefit the local environment and stakeholders.
The seven projects proposed for the CDM involve 1,174 poor, rural
communities, including six indigenous groups. Despite the incentive to plant fast-
growing plantations, FONAFIFO is looking to combine at least a 50-50 mix of
native and non-native vegetation for all its CDM projects (Herrera Ugalde 2008).
Of the 29,000 hectares earmarked for CDM financing, 20,100 hectares are for
natural forest regeneration.25 The remainder provide additional income for
25 Authors calculation based on press releases. Total is based on only six of the CDM projects as there is no data
breakdown for the Zona del Norte project.
landowners through commercial forestry and agroforestry.
Examples of Costa Rica's proposed CDM projects illustrate the
FONAFIFO's determination to fuse carbon sequestration with other social and
economic benefits. The Los Santos project aims to involve bulk coffee growers,
who have suffered economically as a result of fluctuations in the coffee market.
The project aims to reforest 3,000 hectares of land naturally, and diversify
farmers' economic activities by developing 300 hectares of commercial
plantations and planting 105,000 tree to develop a niche market for shade grown
coffee. The Dikes I & II projects target indigenous communities - the Cabagra,
Ujarras, and Salitre on the Pacific Coast and the Brunka descendents in
Puntarenas-to help reforest degraded watershed areas and provide alternative
livelihoods to grazing and agriculture through agroforestry. Only 44 percent and
12.3 percent of their lands respectively remain forested. The projects seek to
reforest 7,500 hectares with natural regeneration and plant 210,000 trees for
agroforestry (FONAFIFO 2008).
These efforts highlight the strength of FONAFIFO's institutional structure
and its financial independence. FONAFIFO's institutional mandate requires it to
develop projects that fuse environmental and social benefits. The agency's
centralized decision-making structure allows it to develop priorities at the national
level, instead of relying on private developers to submit plans to prove that CDM
projects contribute to the country's sustainable development. To this end,
FONAFIFO is currently in the process of identifying lands eligible for the CDM
that maximize other ecosystem benefits, such as biodiversity and watershed
protection. In addition, the 1996 Forestry Law ensures that most of the revenues
generated through ecosystem service sales go to landowners in the form of
payments. FONAFIFO legally may only use five percent of its revenue for
administrative costs (Pagiola 2006). Between 87 and 97 percent of the revenues
generated from carbon sales for CDM projects will be used to pay landowners in
the area where the carbon is generated (FONAFIFO 2008).
Finally, the pressure to develop cost-effective projects does not affect
FONAFIFO, as it would other project developers. The decision to exclude
avoided deforestation from the CDM forced FONAFIFO to diversify its funding
sources. Ironically, this shift has given FONAFIFO independence to create
projects that meet its social and environmental goals, rather than compromising
those goals to attract CDM investors. If the CDM Executive Board rejects the
projects, or it cannot find buyers at its minimum price, FONAFIFO has other
financing options. In fact, according to Maria Elena Herrera Ugalde, head of
finance at FONAFIFO, regardless of what happens with the CDM board of
approval, FONAFIFO will implement all of its seven projects (Herrera Ugalde
2008).
In sum, the CDM fails to provide adequate incentives for developing
countries either to address deforestation or to influence sustainable reforestation.
Not only do the rules inadvertently penalize Costa Rica for its early reforms, but
they also lower the market value of forestry offset projects and create a perverse
incentive for developing countries to create projects that maximize carbon
sequestration at the expense of other benefits. Although Costa Rica expected
that mandatory compliance would give an incentive to developed countries to
support forestry in developing country, the exclusion of avoided deforestation, the
rigidity of CDM rules especially in comparison to those for developed countries,
and the high cost of certification made it close to impossible to finance its forestry
reforms through the official international climate policies.
THE INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTARY AND DOMESTIC CARBON MARKETS
Given the failure of CDM to address avoided deforestation and the difficulty of
getting reforestation projects approved, Costa Rica has looked for new ways to
leverage international concern for climate change to finance its sustainable
forestry. The international voluntary market, with its flexible rules, growing size,
and conservation-friendly buyers, offers a new opportunity to generate funds
from the international community. But to date, the low price of offsets and
uncertain demand make it difficult to rely on this market to finance forestry
projects. Instead, Costa Rican policymakers have launched a national campaign
to be the first carbon-neutral country, hoping to stimulate the country's domestic
market for own forestry-offsets. This effort highlights the shift in Costa Rica's
financing approach for forestry away from an international, market-based
approach towards one that relies primarily on domestic regulation.
The Voluntary Carbon Market: Some Hope for the Future
Unlike the rigid CDM, the international voluntary market with its growing size,
flexible rules, low transaction costs, and conservation-friendly buyers, provides
an opportunity for Costa Rica to generate funds from the international
community. In fact, Costa Rica's early reforms and its political stability make it a
favorite of investors. Although these attributes make it easier for countries to use
the voluntary market, the absence of a mandatory cap means that the demand
for offsets is unpredictable and their value is low.
Since Costa Rica first placed its "certified tradable offsets" (CTOs) on
Chicago Board of Trade in 1998, the U.S. voluntary market has bourgeoned into
a multi-million-dollar industry. From 2006 to 2007 the voluntary carbon market
more than doubled, trading more than 55 million tons of CO2 by the end of 2007.
Although it makes up only 15 percent of the mandatory emissions traded in the
EU, the U.S. market is expected to grow exponentially in the coming years as
companies invest in offsets to prepare for future regulations (Bayon et al. 2007;
Point Carbon 2007).
Voluntary markets, unlike the regulatory ones institutionalized in the Kyoto
Protocol, do not count towards mandatory compliance. Instead investors are
motivated to buy credits for financial and sometimes altruistic reasons. For
example, corporate investors buy credits to meet voluntary targets, prepare for
potential regulatory compliance, improve their public image or meet corporate
social responsibility guidelines. Individuals or non-profits also may buy credits to
offset their own emissions, such as travel or energy consumption, or to support
projects that meet their philanthropic goals (Point Carbon 2007; Taiyab 2005).26
Because there is no legal mandate for emissions reductions in the U.S.,
the voluntary market is highly fragmented and lacks credibility. All the carbon
credits on the voluntary markets come from emissions reductions projects (with
the exception of the Chicago Climate Exchange, for which companies agree to
voluntarily reduce their emissions to a specified target). Carbon credit sales are
negotiated on a case-by-case basis and final prices are often not released.
Moreover, there is no uniform system of certification or verification, nor are
credits registered to a single body. This lack of transparency and uniformity calls
into question the credibility of the voluntary market in reducing emissions.
Buyers face the risk that their credits will not be delivered or that the same credits
will be sold to multiple buyers (Bayon et al. 2007). For this reason, the voluntary
market has gained a reputation as a forum for "snake oil salesmen."
A number of standards have emerged to help increase the legitimacy of
26 More recently, voluntary emission credits have been used for trades to comply with regional climate change plans, such
as the 10-state Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.
the carbon market. The rigidity of these standards varies considerably, however.
For example, the most stringent, Gold standard and VER+, are based on
requirements modeled after the CDM. They require additionality tests based on
investments, regulation, and baseline scenarios. More flexible standards, such
as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), either do not require additionality tests
or allow project developers to chose between different types of proof (Bayon et
al. 2007; Point Carbon 2007). Proponents of these more lenient standards argue
that there is no technically correct method of calculating additionality and that the
flexibility of the market helps create financial incentives to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (Bayon et al. 2007).
More important, this flexibility may actually lead to projects that foster
other social and environmental goals. The decentralized nature of the market
avoids the kinds of bottlenecks created by the need for centralized approval
under the CDM process. The transaction costs for project development are lower
than under the CDM. This lower transaction costs and the flexible standards for
calculating additionality and monitoring projects reduce the pressure on project
developers to maximize carbon sequestration at the expense of other
development goals (Bayon et al. 2007). The types of buyers also may lead to
financing for projects with additional sustainable development benefits. Not
bound by mandatory reductions, private firms often look for credits with a story
that features social and environmental benefits to boost their public image. The
ability of non-profits and socially and ecologically conscious individuals to
participate in the market also may increase the marketability of these projects
(Bayon et al. 2007; Wishnie 2008). Finally, the lack of emphasis on the
technicalities of calculating carbon offsets allows for projects, such as avoided
deforestation and sustainable management, which are prohibited under the
CDM.
These attributes of the voluntary market provide an opportunity for Costa
Rica to finance its conservation initiatives through the voluntary market. In the
past three years, three groups have contacted FONAFIFO to see if they could
market Costa Rican projects on the voluntary market. FONAFIFO had
contracted the Italian firm GEV Modena to look for investors on the European
voluntary market (Herrera Ugalde 2008). Equator Environmental is looking to
market the first AIJ project, Carfix, 53,000 hectares of conserved lands in the
Central Volcanic Region on the U.S. voluntary market. In 2006 the American-
based Pax Natura Foundation volunteered to sell tropical avoided deforestation
projects on the voluntary market (Wishnie 2008; Tolpinrud 2008). In addition,
Daniel Janzen, the conservation biologist who proposed Biodiversifix and wrote
the GRUAS report, has been approached by a number of brokers to market the
national park, the Guanacaste Conservation Area, which he maintains and once
submitted to AIJ. Janzen is now negotiating with Costa Rican officials about
reviving the Protected Areas Project through the international voluntary market
(Janzen 2008).
Equator Environmental, Pax Natura, and GEV Modena all act as brokers
for Costa Rican projects. As a governmental entity, FONAFIFO is not authorized
to negotiate deals with individual buyers. OCIC has lost most of its authority due
to staff cuts and push for a more technical role in the climate negotiations and
CDM. These intermediaries thus are essential in helping FONAFIFO package
and market their projects to potential buyers. Equator and Pax Natura are
currently looking to find buyers and to certify these projects under the Voluntary
Carbon Standard (VCS) in order to enhance their credibility on the market. In
addition, Equator hopes to find markets for the emissions already accrued by
Carfix. As a for-profit entity, however, Equator will receive half of the sale profits,
while the brokerage firm started by Pax Natura will only use funds to cover their
administrative costs.. (Wishnie 2008; Tolpinrud 2008).
The Pax Natura Foundation provides an interesting case of the types of
altruistic entities involved in the voluntary market. Since the 1980s, the
foundation has been involved in efforts to conserve Costa Rican tropical forests.
It has supported environmental education programs and purchased private land
for park consolidation (Fundacion Pax Natura Abrira Escuela Ambiental En Costa
Rica 2002; Tolpinrud 2008). The founders of Pax Natura, William Connelly and
Randall Tolpinrud, were impressed with the success of the PSA program in the
region where they had originally bought lands. Between 1999 and 2005, a total
7,193 hectares were enrolled in the incentive program. In order to avoid the
deforestation of approximately 6,160 hectares in 10 years, Connelly and
Tolpinrud proposed creating a separate brokerage arm of the foundation to sell
credits and raise funds to continue and expand this support throughout the
region. The total expected emissions reductions are close to 2 million metric tons
of C02 per year and the total project cost is estimated at around $9.7 dollars over
the period of 10 years (Tolpinrud 2008; FUNDECOR et al. 2006).
The Pax Natura's involvement in offset projects highlights the opening in
the voluntary market for entities whose primary interest is forest protection.
Despite Pax Natura's status as a non-profit, all three brokers hope to help avoid
tropical forest deforestation and believe that carbon markets are the best
solution. In fact, in interviews, representatives of both Equator and Pax Natura
emphasized their motivation to help Costa Rica share the costs of their
conservation efforts with the international community (Herrera Ugalde 2008;
Wishnie 2008; Tolpinrud 2008).
Costa Rica has many advantages in using the international voluntary
market. Unlike with the CDM, Costa Rica's long running private incentive
program is one of its major assets on the voluntary market. According to Mark
Wishnie, project planner for Equator Environmental, Costa Rica was an ideal
location to invest in for the voluntary carbon market because of its political
stability and long-standing private incentive program. "The whole structure of the
infrastructure allows for execution of forestry carbon projects and their placement
on the public registry. They have a national system of land use and verification...
All these resources don't exist in other places" (Wishnie 2008). Working within
the existing framework of the private incentive program makes it easier for
managers to focus on project marketing without the need to establish
infrastructure for verification and monitoring. Moreover, the long-standing
incentive program and Costa Rica's reputation as a peaceful democracy adds
legitimacy to Costa Rican projects. According to Janzen, "all of the sudden, the
world is interested in Costa Rican carbon projects. I don't know what the market
really looks like or what it will cost, how long it will last. Should I sell it one at a
time, retail or wholesale or the whole farm? I'm like a farmer who grows
tomatoes and all of the sudden market is crazy about tomatoes" (Janzen 2008).
On the other hand, the long-term demand for voluntary credits and the
marketability of Costa Rican projects are still unknown. As with the CDM, most
buyers are interested in the cheap offsets. In 2007 the amount of carbon sold on
voluntary market in the U.S. alone tripled. Twenty percent of the projects
transacted were land-use and forestry projects, but they only make up a tiny
portion of the volume of CO2 on the market. The largest quantity is made up of
the same cheap methane reduction projects, as in the CDM market (Point
Carbon 2007).
In addition to this appetite for cheap offsets, the prices of U.S. voluntary
offsets are also lower and more volatile than those on the EU's regulatory market
due to the absence of mandatory caps to stabilize supply and demand.
Projects typically go for between $2 and $15 per tons of CO2, compared to
certifiable emissions reduction (CERs) prices, which ranged from $7 to $14 per
ton of CO2 in 2007. Forestry projects tend to be on the lower end (Bayon et al.
2007; Point Carbon 2007, 2008). According to Tolpinrud, FONAFIFO is looking to
finance the Pax Natura project at a minimum of $7 per ton of CO2 (Tolpinrud
2008). Moreover, Janzen is looking to raise $500 million for the Protected Area
Project (Janzen 2008). Given the current prices, it is highly unlikely that Costa
Rica will be able to achieve this level of financing on the U.S. voluntary market.
Although a few NGOs are trying to develop a niche market for
sustainability-rich, and thus more costly, credits, a survey by the investment
group EcoSecurities indicates that only 40 percent of companies investing in the
voluntary market would be willing to pay more for such a project (Zwick 2007).
Given the unwillingness of most buyers to pay more for niche credits, the higher
land values and small size of the country means that countries like Bolivia have
the potential to outbid Costa Rica on the market.27 Moreover, companies
interested in enhancing their public image can simply purchase the bulk of their
credits cheaply with only a small portion dedicated to public relations friendly
credits. For example, the Italian company Lifegate, Costa Rica's first investor on
21 Bolivia is rumored to have outbid Costa Rica for a number of AIJ project financing and on the voluntary market.
the voluntary market, broadcasts its contribution to the program, despite only
having purchased credits equivalent to 350 hectares of land (Lifegate n.d. ; Rojas
et al. 2007).
In addition to the current low price of voluntary offsets and questionable
demand for more expensive niche credits, the high volume and questionable
nature of projects have led to talks about regulating the voluntary market.
Depending on the definitions of additionality, these efforts may benefit or
penalize Costa Rica. On the unregulated market, Costa Rica's reputation for
sound environmental management and its stable democratic governance, made
it a favorite for many socially responsible investors (Salinas 2008). If a higher
regulatory standard adopts the strict view of additionality of the CDM, Costa Rica
may be penalized. Currently, both Pax Natura and Equator Environmental are
using methodologies developed by Franz Tattenbach to calculate baselines and
additionality, which have a looser definition of additionality than the CDM
(Wishnie 2008; FUNDECOR et al. 2006).
Despite its flexibility and the intentions of altruistic brokers on the
international voluntary market, it is too early to forecast whether this unregulated
market will finance Costa Rican projects. While the Pax Natura Foundation has
donated one million dollars to FONAFIFO as payment for the first year of
emissions reductions, to date only one sale for 350 hectares of conservation has
been transacted (Herrera Ugalde 2008; Tolpinrud 2008). Although its flexibility
and low transaction costs makes it easier to place forestry offset projects of the
international voluntary market, the experience with AIJ and the current low prices
have made Costa Rica wary of placing too many projects on the international
voluntary market too soon. Currently, Fundecor is the main organization looking
to guarantee future environmental service payments to farmers in the Central
Volcanic Mountainous Range through the voluntary markets. It has exclusive
contracts to market a total of 67,000 hectares of land to Environmental Equator
and Pax Natura. FONAFIFO expects to add projects earmarked for the CDM on
both the voluntary and Kyoto compliant markets, but it is uncertain how much it
will use this market (Herrera Ugalde 2008). 'VERs pay nothing, $2 on the
exchange. This is not going to pay for anything we need," claims Jorge Monge
Zeledon, an environmental consultant to the Costa Rican government,
commenting on the Costa Rica's ambitions for the international market. "Instead
we have chosen to develop a standard nationally and a marketing instrument, C-
neutral" (Monge Zeledon 2008).
Stimulating a Market from Within
By stimulating a market for carbon offsets within its borders, Costa Rica hopes to
get the price it needs to pay for its conservation efforts. This effort highlights
Costa Rica's disappointing experience with the international climate policies and
carbon markets. Although the country has had some initial success generating
revenue through the current domestic voluntary market, mandating carbon
neutrality may be difficult because of the high cost of mitigation and opposition
from agricultural interests.
In February 2007 President Oscar Arias Sanchez announced Costa Rica's
intention to be the first carbon-neutral developing country by 2021. Costa Ricans
emit few greenhouse gases-2.2 metric tons of CO2 per capita annually,
compared to 24 and 9.5 metric tons emitted by U.S. and E.U. citizens
respectively (Instituto meteorologico nacional 2005; Costa Rica Protege Al
Planeta 2007). Cumulatively, this represents less than .01 percent of the world's
annual emissions. Nonetheless, Costa Rica believes that by going carbon
neutral, it will be able to increase its competitive advantage and stimulate new
ways to finance conservation activities.
Costa Rica's plan for carbon neutrality focuses on reducing emissions at
their source. To be announced at the end of March 2008, the National Strategy
for Climate Change (ENCC) identifies the key sources of emissions in Costa Rica
and proposes a host of policy changes to address them. Transportation, the
leading cause of emission in Costa Rica, contributes to 29 percent of the
country's greenhouse gases. Livestock contributes 22 percent, agriculture 21
percent, and 12 and 11 percent are linked to emissions from industries and
garbage, respectively (Instituto Meteorologico Nacional 2005). The plan
proposes changes to the energy sector to allow companies and individuals to
generate electricity on their own, creates incentives for carbon neutral industries,
and makes changes in land use and agriculture. At this stage, however, ENCC
is focusing on voluntary programs to help companies and individuals reduce and
mitigate their carbon footprint.
To this end, the Ministry of Environment has created a trademark for
carbon neutral companies. From the outset demand for the C-Neutral mark was
very high, with more companies applying than ENCC's small staff and resources
could handle (Monge Zeledon 2008; Musmanni 2008). As a pilot phase, ENCC
has enrolled 11 groups who have agreed to let the government calculate their
carbon footprint and identify strategies for emissions reductions and
compensation. These include large multinationals like Chiquita Banana, Dole,
Coca Cola, and local companies, including two of the largest construction
companies (Estrategia Nacioin de Cambio Climatico 2007). In an interview with
NPR, Costa Rica's environmental minister Roberto Dobles describes his vision
for a carbon neutral banana. "What is a carbon neutral banana? It is a banana
that reduces emissions at the agricultural level, at the local transportation level
from the farms to the airport, and will also reduce the emissions from the boats
that take the bananas to the free market" (Burnett 2008). Chiquita and Dole are
considering strategies to decrease their emissions, by growing their own
biodiesel and improving plantation management (Musmanni 2008). While these
actions help reduce emissions directly, to neutralize their carbon footprint
companies will also have to commit funds, between $5 to $10 per ton of CO2, to
compensate farmers for conservation on private lands through the PSA program
(Fonseca 2007; Vargas 2008).
The move towards carbon neutrality has created a new domestic carbon
market for Costa Rica's conservation program. In addition to the pilot program,
FONAFIO in conjunction with the Costa Rican Tourism Institute have developed
a way for travelers to reduce their airline emissions by investing in the landowner
program. Companies and individuals can calculate their emissions online and
pay to compensate them for $5 per metric ton of CO2. In the first two months of
the program, seven industries, hotels, local airlines, and 316 individuals signed
up to mitigate their airline emissions through the private incentive program
(Aguero 2007). FONAFIFO has raised a total of $5,715 and mitigated 1,143 tons
of CO2. For example, the airline Nature Air agreed to incorporate the fee as a tax
on all their airplane tickets. Jorge Mario Rodriguez, director of FONAFIFO,
expects that the voluntary plan will help generate up to $40 million between 2007
and 2011 for FONAFIFO (Vargas 2007).
Through these new efforts, Costa Rica also hopes to boost the image of
Costa Rican offsets abroad. The government is developing a new standard for
calculating and verifying emissions credits. Costa Rica hopes that the new
trademark also will increase the value of carbon offsets on the international
market. "If Costa Rica gets a reputation as a good, reliable market, than buyers
will be willing to pay for more expensive CERs or VERs. They will be able to
take on the brand C-neutral" (Monge Zeledon 2008). Skeptics claim that this
new effort is just smoke and mirrors, however. Bioeco, a carbon mitigation
company, claims that the government's monopoly on offsets fails to create a real
competitive market and will just fatten the pockets of politicians (Fonseca Q
2008). Friends of the Earth, an international environmental NGO, points to Costa
Rica's hypocrisy in calling for carbon neutrality on the one hand while negotiating
with China to develop a new refinery on the other (Burnett 2008). Moreover,
critics of the PSA program claim that it is unclear how FONAFIFO will use the
funds it raises. Given that the funds are not project based, as they are in the
international markets, FONAFIFO has more discretion over resources.
Individuals pay five dollars for each ton of CO2 they emit, but conservation
payments may not actually be covering the emissions they are supposed to.
Furthermore, although Costa Rican companies are currently lining up to
get the C-neutral brand, carbon neutrality may be difficult for the government to
achieve. Paulo Manso, the director of the National Metereological Institute
admits that Costa Rica does not yet know if it can achieve neutrality or just meet
a target (Manso 2008). In 2005 Costa Rican plant life absorbed about 2.5 million
tons of C02; but Costa Ricans produced five times that about 12.5 million tons of
CO 2 (Burnett 2008). Increasing these emission reductions through Costa Rican
forests may be untenable without strong regulations on land use. But Costa
Rica faces many political and financial challenges in making carbon neutrality
mandatory. Agricultural and livestock interests have strongly opposed the idea of
carbon neutrality. "Right now there is a tension as plans are developed on one
side for increasing livestock and agriculture, and on the other side the strategy
for C-neutrality. How can you have both? Who knows who will win the battle"
(Musmanni 2008).
Without mandatory cap on emissions, the Costa Rican voluntary market
may suffer the same failures of the international voluntary carbon market: a low
price and uncertain demand. Nonetheless, given the sluggish movement of the
CDM, these domestic efforts to capitalize on the carbon craze may help Costa
Rica come a little closer to achieving its sustainable development goals.
EVALUATING COSTA RICA'S FOREST POLICY
The Costa Rican case highlights how countries can think creatively about
reframing climate change in order to meet their own sustainable development
goals. In the early days of the climate regime, Costa Rican actors played an
integral role domestically and internationally. They reshaped the country's
forestry policy to take advantage of the climate funds while reinforcing other
social and environmental goals. They also helped create a permanent
mechanism that would allow developing countries to implement projects that met
their own domestic priorities. Despite the ingenuity of these domestic political
actors, to date Costa Rica has failed to finance its sustainable forestry reforms
through the international climate policies and carbon markets.
In fact, although Costa Rica hoped to promote itself as a model for using
international markets to finance sustainable development, it has demonstrated
instead that international grants and domestic efforts to internalize the costs of
environmental services may be more effective than the international carbon
market. This new, mandatory approach points to both Costa Rica's pragmatism
in relation to forestry financing and its disappointing experience with the
international carbon market. This financing shift however has come at the
expense of its original goal to conserve 90 percent of the country's biodiversity
through national park consolidation.
Between 1994, the inception of the experimental period of Activities
Implemented Jointly (AIJ), and 2005 Costa Rica generated a mere $5.2 million
dollars from the official international carbon market.28 Approximately $3 million of
these carbon dollars were generated during the AIJ phase from two projects.
The remaining came from the World Bank's Biocarbon fund, created to help
facilitate CDM forestry projects.29 Compare this figure to the estimated $10
million dollars generated annually by the gas tax since 2001 (Pagiola 2006).
Even though Costa Rica hopes to stimulate a domestic carbon market
28 This does not include voluntary funds.
29 Calculated by author from UNFCC website for AIJ and CDM projects and FONAFIFO's website.
within its own borders, voluntary markets for environmental services provide only
a slice of the revenue needed to support the private incentive program. From
2001 to 2005, 11 water service providers--including a bottling company, four
hydroelectric companies, and municipal water providers--have financed
conservation payments, equivalent to an average of $500,000 annually. To date,
Conservation International is the only buyer of conservation certificates (CSAs)
for biodiversity, having donated $500,000 to pay half of the cost of agroforestry
contracts in three key conservation areas. The National Institute of Biodiversity
has signed a number of bioprospecting contracts with pharmaceutical and
research firms like Merck, but there has been little market interest in financing
biodiversity conservation on private lands. Despite the plethora of ecotourist
companies in Costa Rica, none have invested in its scenic beauty contracts.
In fact, Costa Rica has been shifting away from a voluntary market-based
approach towards one based on compulsory domestic fees and international
grants. Since 2001 the PSA has primarily been financed through approximately
$70 million in gas tax revenues, a $32.6 million loan from the World Bank, a $8
million grant from GEF, and a $2.3 million development grant from the German
organization KfW. Beginning in 2007 PSA has been financed through an
additional $8 million from GEF and a $10 million loan from the World Bank
Mainstreaming Market Based Incentives for Environmental Management
(MMBIEM) program. In 2006 the Legislative Assembly passed a law to increase
water tariffs to the Costa Rican consumers, a move that is expected to generate
$19 million annually. One-fourth ($5 million) of these payments will go to
FONAFIFO to finance environmental service agreements in the watershed where
the funds are generated, and one-fourth will go to maintaining protected areas
(Pagiola 2006; Herrera Ugalde, 2008). In addition, if fully implemented, Costa
Rica's carbon neutral strategy will generate additional dollars, as companies are
compelled to mitigate their carbon footprint.
This new, mandatory approach points to both Costa Rica's pragmatism in
relation to forestry financing and its disappointing experience with the
international carbon market. While the country initially expected to finance both
its social and ecological goals of its forestry reform through the international
climate mechanism, political decisions at the international level, the CDM's
hostile rules and high cost of implementation, and the lack of binding
commitments of the voluntary market have inhibited these developments. These
barriers have forced Costa Rica to find new and stable sources of financing,
which may have in fact enhance its indigenous ability to implement projects that
meet its own social and ecological goals. In fact, although Costa Rica has failed
to use international climate policies and markets to support its sustainable forest
reforms, it has been successful in finding domestic forms of financing for its
private landowner program.
By diversifying its sources of financing, FONAFIFO has expanded the
program to a total of 377,000 hectares and 1.2 million trees in the last 10 years
(FONAFIFO 2007). Yet the evidence pointing to the social and ecological
benefits of the PSA program is mixed. A World Bank study indicates that
FONAFIFO has done a good job increasing small landowner and minority
participation. In 2005, 60 percent of contracts, representing 40 percent of the
area conserved, were collective contracts for small landowners (Pagiola 2006).
During 2004, female participation accounted for 11 percent of the hectares
enrolled, a 1,114 percent increase from 1997. Participation of indigenous
communities had increased by 536 percent (Elizondo 2004 cited in FONAFIFO
2005). A study in the Osa Penninsula, where 50 percent of the farmers live in
extreme poverty, showed that the payments played a significant role in
maintaining the livelihoods of poor farmers (Munoz 2004; FONAFIFO 2005). Yet
no comprehensive study of the incentive program has attempted to look how
payments are distributed or its impact on poverty.
Assessing ecological benefits of Costa Rica's environmental payment
program has been more difficult. Although PSA program is supposed to benefit
biodiversity, watershed protection, scenic value and sequestration, FONAFIFO
assumes that all these benefits are generated just based on the hectares
enrolled in the program, not on any systematic verification. According to a World
Bank study, at the end of 2005, 30 percent of active contracts were in the
biodiversity priority areas identified by the GRUAS report. If one includes other
priority areas identified by international donors such as transboundary biological
corridors, this figure increases to 59 percent. Only 3 percent were contracted
inside protected areas, however-the areas which Costa Rica had intended to
purchase (Pagiola 2006). Furthermore, only two areas are currently monitored
for biodiversity, and both are funded through GEF's Ecomarket project, which
explicitly identified areas to test the biodiversity benefits of private lands near
biological corridors and on former pasture lands (Pagiola 2006). Similarly, none
of the hydrological areas under water conservation contracts have been tested
for improvement in water quality. While they are the most difficult to finance,
CDM projects are the only ones that require verification beyond forest-cover
evaluations.
To address the environmental and social shortcomings of the program, the
Arias administration is making efforts to improve the program's focus and
deliverables. FONAFIFO is currently in the process of identifying areas where
biodiversity, watershed, and carbon sequestration can be maximized
simultaneously. With the help of a second GEF EcoMarkets grant, Costa Rica is
developing a biodiversity fund to target and monitor biodiversity priority areas
(Herrera Ugalde 2008). Water service fees will help expand the program to
different regions and may require monitoring. The environmental ministry
(MINAE) is also considering introducing a poverty relief payment as a
complement to the ecosystem services payment, with the help of funds from the
World Bank. In addition, the administration hopes that the government's new
guidelines for carbon neutrality will increase the accuracy of carbon
sequestration calculations (Monge Zeledon 2008).
Although these efforts should help Costa Rica improve the efficacy of the
PSA program in meeting its sustainable development objectives, many
conservationists still believe that incentives to landowners are a poor solution for
protecting forests in the long term when compared to national park consolidation.
The decision to exclude avoided deforestation in the CDM and the conditions of
the World Bank loan meant that there have been no sources of financing for this
effort. Moreover, according to Janzen, after the end of the Figueres
administration the government lost its focus on preserving four percent of the
world's biodiversity and began funneling all its resources towards the more
politically popular environmental service payment program.
[The original goal was] to consolidate individually conserved pieces
and to get them back into big lumps. The only thing that will
eventually survive are the big lumps. But when the [Figueres]
government ended, the whole thing died...In theory the [PSA
program] was supposed to pay for a piece of land until you could
buy it... It was not until the end of last administration that I was able
to understand that this was not going on (Janzen 2008).
According to Janzen, Costa Rica's inability to generate funds through
international carbon market coupled with new financing for the PSA program
influenced the government to move away from the original goals of protecting 90
percent of Costa Rica's biodiversity through park consolidation to a more
unfocused conservation program.
Reorienting Costa Rica's program towards this original goal should be a
domestic and international priority. The Costa Rican government needs to renew
its effort to consolidate the country's national park system, by prioritizing private
lands for purchase, strengthening local park administration and building
synergies between the private land program and national park system. As a first
step, FONAFIFO should prioritize private conservation and reforestation around
national park boundaries or in areas that yet have been consolidated. MINAE
however should develop a long-term plan for buying up the parcels identified in
the GRUAS report and maintaining them in the long term. One option, proposed
by Janzen, would be to decentralize national park management and financing to
give local authorities more control over management decisions.30 Verifying land
use changes through satellite imagery and monitoring areas vulnerable to
logging on the ground should be invested in heavily.
These efforts require a significant financial investment. Currently, most of
the new mandatory taxes are earmarked for the PSA program. Distributing funds
to both the national park system and private land conservation could help
30 Under the current national park system, local park authorities must first get central government approval before making
management decisions. This process is slow and bureaucratic. Conflicts are common between the central government
and local forest managers due to differences in priorities and management style. Janzen already manages the Area de
Conservacion Guanacaste independently through a non-profit. Decentralizing the entire national park system would
allow local authorities more discretion over how funds are used. Annual or biannual audits by the central government
would ensure that funds were not used inappropriately.
jumpstart the effort to protect 90 percent of Costa Rica's biodiversity in
perpetuity. This domestic financing however will likely be insufficient to support
both programs.
For Costa Rica to finance its forest reforms adequately, the global benefit
from the country's forest must be paid. International climate policies remain one
of the few chances to pay this debt and help Costa Rica institutionalize the
original reforms it hoped to undertake.
CONCLUSION: THE ROAD TO BALI AND BEYOND
Costa Rica's efforts to use international climate policies and markets illustrate the
failure of the existing climate regime to provide meaningful incentives to
developing countries to stem global deforestation and increase reforestation.
Political decisions at the international level that favored the interests of
developed countries over those of forestry advocates in developing countries led
to this failure, first by excluding incentives for avoided deforestation and second
by creating an unnecessarily complicated mechanism for reforestation incentives
for developing countries. This outcome is quite common in international treaty
making because of what is known as the "two-level game" of international
negotiations (Putnam 1988). At a domestic level, domestic interest groups
compete to pressure the government to adopt policies favorable to their interests.
At the international level, negotiators from each country "seek to maximize their
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse
consequences of foreign development" (Putnam 1988). This domestic-
international balancing act often detracts from the overarching environmental
goals of the treaty. In fact, negotiators often look for stability and consensus at
the expense of environmental effectiveness and equity (Ross 1996).
The "stability-effectiveness trade-off" is evident in the international climate
regime's negotiations over forests (Ross 1996). At the beginning, two strong
coalitions competed over the inclusion of avoided deforestation in the CDM. But
the U.S.'s decision to drop out of the negotiations weakened the coalition in favor
of incentives for avoided deforestation. Developed countries that had once
supported these incentives agreed to exclude them in order to maximize their
own domestic gains. This international decision enabled the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol, but it significantly limited Costa Rica's ability to implement its
domestic forestry reforms; it also compromised the effectiveness of the
international regime in addressing the second largest cause of deforestation. In
fact, the weak regime is discourages developing countries from reducing their
deforestation and creates a disincentive for countries to link climate change to
sustainable development.
The consequences of the international climate regime's weaknesses are
clear: in the developing world, it is still more lucrative to cut down trees than to
protect them. One ton of carbon from avoided tropical deforestation in Costa
Rica has the same benefit as one ton of carbon from building a wind turbine in
Sweden. Yet a ton of carbon emissions sequestered or avoided in Sweden is
worth about $15 on the E.U. carbon exchange, while the equivalent in a
developing country has no value. More than 15 years since the inception of the
UNFCCC, the world continues to lose almost 13 million hectares of forests-an
area more than twice the size of Costa Rica-every year to logging, agriculture,
and other activities (VOA English Service 2007). As a result, deforestation still
accounts for 20 to 25 percent of the global emissions.
Thankfully, a global consensus is emerging around the importance of
addressing deforestation in the international climate change regime. In 2005
Costa Rica, in collaboration with Papua New Guinea, formed a new, multi-
regional Coalition for Rainforest Nations to bring back avoided deforestation in
the second commitment phase and shape the rules for a new mechanism. A
year later, the group submitted a consensus document to the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice offering to reduce emissions voluntarily by
conserving forests in exchange for access to international markets for emissions
trading. The first time that developing countries had agreed to reduce their
emissions voluntarily, this submission was a huge step in creating consensus
around a new Protocol (Coalition for Rainforest Nations 2006).
In November 2006 calls for the inclusion of avoided deforestation gained
prominence through the release of the Stern Report. Created by the British
economist Nicholas Stern, the report outlines the strategies to address climate
change, which Stern calls the "greatest global market failure we have ever seen"
(Stern 2006). Stern argues for making avoided deforestation one of four key
elements of a global mitigation strategy, calling it a "highly cost effective way of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions...fairly quickly" (Richards and Jenkins
2007). The Stern report, as well as pressure from developing countries,
prompted climate negotiators to renew discussions about avoided deforestation
at the 2007 Bali negotiations, where they gathered to set the agenda for the
second commitment phase.
As it turned out, the inclusion of avoided deforestation was one of the few
issues that negotiators could agree on at Bali. (The U.S.'s refusal to agree on
numerical targets for emissions reductions stymied negotiations about the next
commitment period.) According to Elliot Diringer, director of international
strategies at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, forest protection "was
the one concrete area where you had a contingent of developing countries
coming forward and saying, 'We want to do something. Let's talk about what we
can do"' (Greising 2007). The World Bank's announcement of its new $300
million Forest Carbon Partnership program to help countries develop avoided
deforestation projects bolstered support for the inclusion of avoided deforestation
on the Bali Road Map (VOA English Service 2007). Furthermore, since the
original CDM negotiations in 2001, Brazil has lifted its opposition to including
incentives for conservation.
This strengthening consensus is a major step, but the appropriate design
of a new mechanism remains uncertain. Most scientists advocate for a fund that
would pay developing countries for lowering their deforestation rates and
increasing forest cover on the national level. Countries would need to develop
national inventories of their forest stocks, which could be monitored using
satellite technology. Such a system would correct many of the problems
currently attributed to the CDM: it would lower the transaction costs of project
approval, calculating carbon sequestration, and tracking permanence, and would
address scientific concerns about leakage of project-based activities. It would
also increase the scale of reforms (Peskett and Harkin 2007).31 Funding has
been notoriously unreliable in global environmental treaties, however, and
conflicts over the management and distribution of payments are often intense
(Fairman 1996). Moreover, many economists doubt countries will raise the
amount of capital needed to reduce deforestation. According to the Stern report,
between $5 and $15 billion annually is needed to reduce deforestation by 50
percent (Stern 2006). Instead economists propose a market-based approach
based on national inventories. As with the CDM, countries would compete on
international market for financing. Companies could either invest in projected
emissions reductions from an overall decrease in deforestation and increase in
forest cover, or pay for them after they occur.
Many developing countries, including those in the Coalition for Rainforest
Nations, favor a national approach that guarantees funding for large-scale
changes without complicated project-by-project calculations, temporary crediting
systems, and verification. Such an approach would allow developing countries to
develop programs at whatever level-national, sectoral or local-they deem best
suited to meet their national targets (Coalition for Rainforest Nations 2007).
Brazil opposes a national mechanism, however. It wants a supplementary
"3 As noted earlier, many scientists were concerned that forest-offset projects did not account for changes in land use and
deforestation in other areas of a country (leakage). In contrast, tracking deforestation and reforestation using country-
wide satellite imagery allows monitoring of leakage in a more cost-effective and scientifically rigorous way.
mechanism that is project based, like the CDM, which is not contingent on the
country's deforestation rates.32
The history of events since 1992 illustrates the need to develop a proposal
that can unite different interests through flexible policies that guarantee funding
for developing countries with different levels of deforestation. Interest-based
conflicts among countries have for too long stymied action to address
deforestation. Complicated rules used to reduce scientific uncertainty have
impeded efforts to slow deforestation. Although a national approach meets the
needs of both countries that want to lower their deforestation and scientists who
want to ensure carbon accounts are accurate, a parallel project-based approach
would allow countries that are not ready to support and participate in such a
regime.
For a market approach to work, however, developed nations need to
adopt more stringent emissions cuts in order to stimulate the market price
necessary to influence developing countries to curb their deforestation rates.33
According to the IPCC at least $20 per ton of CO2 is needed; others put the
figure between $40 to $50 (Coalition for Rainforest Nations 2007). Although
international decisions have had a negative impact on developing countries to
date, a substantial investment on the international level could have a beneficial
catalytic effect by empowering domestic advocates in developing countries and
32 Brazil argues that a decentralized approach would decrease the need for administration on the national level and create
a more direct link between avoided deforestation and payments. Brazil's proposal reflects the country's concern that it will
not be able to lower its deforestation rate quickly enough to take advantage of these financial incentives.
33 Getting the U.S. to agree to substantial cuts is unlikely. This however should not deter other developed countries to
accept deeper emissions targets. The U.S. will likely create its own parallel system. For example, the U.S. Congress is
considering a bill that could generate $28 billion for avoided deforestation from 2012 to 2020. The Lieberman-Warner
proposal hopes to get these funds by limiting emissions credits in the U.S. and distributing 2.5 percent of them to
developing countries for avoided deforestation. This scheme would improve the U.S.'s image by making it the "early
mover in developing this market" (Malcomson 2008).
building pro-reform government alliances (Keohane 1996; Fairman and Ross
1996).34 Deeper cuts should be complemented by other intermediate incentives,
such as a global fund and additional commitments for overseas development
assistance, to build capacity in developing countries, help them create national
forest inventories, and subsidize activities until a market is created.35
Rewarding early actor should also be a hallmark of the next international
climate policy.36 Providing incentives only to countries that were major polluters
and deforesters sends a perverse message to countries about the importance of
environmental protection and sets a bad precedent for future international
environmental treaties. Although getting these big polluters on board is
essential to address emissions from deforestation, proving early reformers with
the ability to participate in the regime, through incentives for long-term
conservation and maintenance and flexible historical baselines, is essential to the
equity and efficiency of a future international climate policy.
34 For example, in the Philippines, "green" conditions attached to structural adjustment loans helped strengthen domestic
conservation advocates in the Aquino government.
35 For example the Coalition for Rainforests Nations proposed a number of possible strategies to generate the estimated
$15 billion annually to curb deforestation in developing countries. These include: creating a fund through a $.3 per barrel
taxes on oil, voluntary user fees of $22/ton on air transport, or $.3 fees on emissions allowances, increasing overseas
development assistance by 12.5%, developing a voluntary market solely for forestry offsets, and increasing emissions
commitments for developed countries by 9 percent.
36 At Bali, Costa Rica, supported by India, fought hard for a reference to financial incentives for conservation and
management activities in the final agenda (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2007). The Coalition for Rainforest Nations has
proposed a basket of incentives and mitigation options which include a reference to early action and flexible baselines but
the reference to early action remains bracketed in the final text (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2007; Coalition for Rainforest
Nations 2007). In fact, most forest experts expect that the new avoided deforestation mechanism will base deforestation
credits against historical baseline rates; the choice of dates will likely create winners and losers (Richards and Jenkins
2007). Winners are likely to be countries with high deforestation rates, like Brazil and Indonesia, where 80 percent of
carbon dioxide emissions stem from deforestation. Again, Costa Rica is likely to lose out on much of the financial benefits
given its positive net gain in forest cover in the last ten years.
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES














































































first to put a AIJ project;













Group to fortify CDM in
forestry and bio-energy
in latin america
Group in charge of
climate change plan
Group in charge of
climate change plan














New group trying to
market Costa Rican
projects on AIJ market
Research group that




































The ECOLAND Projects aims
to preserve tropical forest
through the purchase of
approximately 2,500 privately-
owned hectares in the Piedras
Blancas National Park(formerly named the Esquinas
National Park) in southwestern
Costa Rica. The purchased
land would be transfered to the
Costa Rican Park Service for
permanent protection. The
Ecoland project would protect
20% of the parkland.
In the Virilla river basin, the
project includes four thousand
hectare (ha) of reforestation
and forest
conservation/regeneration.
One thousand ha were
targeted for reforestation and
3,000 ha for conservation.
'All project information comes from the UNFCCC AIJ website at httD://unfccc.int/kyoto mechanisms/aij/activities implemented iointly/items/2087.php (UNFCCC n.d)
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PAP project aimed to purchase
Protected of approximately 530,000 ha of
Area Conservation privately owned hectares in
Project and national parks in Costa Ricas 8
(PAP) AIJ regeneration no 55817248 530000 530000 biological zones.
Project CARFIX aimed to
stabilize the existing natural
forest and create additional
forest cover in the Central
Volcanic Conservation Area(ACCVC), which constitutes a
Conservation 290,187-hectare (ha) buffer
and zone surrounding the World
reforestation/ Biosphere Reserve of Braulio
Carfix AIJ regeneration no 21778313 108265 92053 16207 Carrillo National Park.
The Klinki Forestry Project
aimed to convert pastures and
marginal farmland to
commercial tree plantations by
promoting the planting of 6,000
hectares of private farms with
a mixture of selected fast-
growing Klinki and other tree
species. The trees will be
harvested periodically for use
in long-lived lumber products
(such as utility poles) or left
standing. The project will
include small, medium, and
large farms, educational pilot
projects, and investor farms.
Farmers will be given
incentives for plantings in
return for the rights to the




WETFIX and DRYFIX. Carbon
sequestration in WETFIX




mosaic of middle-aged to
primary wet forest. Some
6,100 ha of natural and semi-
natural forest would be
regenerated within the current
boundaries of the conservation
area of Guanacaste (ACG),
and 7,400 ha of marginal
pasture to be purchased and
added to the ACG.Biodiverfix Regeneration 18481680
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$2,207,000 300 3600 180,000
project is the recovery of
the forest cover in 3,900
ha, which are presently
dedicated to pasturelands
or croplands (due to
reforestation and natural
regeneration). These new
areas would provide raw
material for the forest
industry, decreasing the
illegal logging and
damage of the remaining
natural forest. 14 rural
communities near the
project area. Their main
economic activities are
based on agriculture and
cattle-raising. These
activities are going
through difficult times due
to fluctuations in the
international prices.







































































The goal of the project is
to recover 3750 ha of




forests will provide raw
material for the forest
industry, decreasing the
illegal logging and
damage of the remaining
natural forest. 258 rural
towns are in the project
area. Their main
economic activities are
based on agriculture and
cattle farming.
The goal of this project is
recovering 4800 ha
which are presently
dedicated to pasture. 211
rural communities area in
the project area. Their
main economic activities





vegetative cover of the
indigenous lands in Costa
Rica's Pacific Zone.
Except for the areas at
high elevation, pastures
have replaced the forest
cover over. Dense forest
areas declined about 63%
in 1972. By 1997, only
about 44 % of the
watersheds remain under
dense forest cover, much
of it restricted to high
elevation areas of the
indigenous territories. The



























Salitre want to revert this
deforestation. 14 rural
communities live near the
project area.
Only 12.3% of the land
belonging to the Brunka
people is still forested. 37
rural communities live
near the project area.
Their main economic
activities are based on
agriculture and cattle-
raisina
The recovery of 4800 ha
of land presently
dedicated to pasture is
the main goal of this
project. 113 rural
communities live in the
project area. Their main
economic activities are
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The main goal is the
restoration of 4500ha of
forest cover currently
dedicated to pasture. 527
rural communities live in
the project area, who
mainly depend on
agriculture and pasture.




sugar cane.Zona Norte CDM PIN
594 876 over
20 years 4,500 n/a n/a 4500 180000
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LIICgdt: I n purGcnaseo
carbon credits for
conservation, reforestaion
and agroforestry on 350ha
of lands. One of the
project locations includes
an agroforestry on the the
Bribri Indigenous reserve.
(Herrera Ugalde, 2008)
In the cordillera volcanic
central valley, this site
connects three national
parks of Braulio Carillo,
Irazu and Turrialba and
two Atlantic aquifers (Pax
Natura 2008).
In the cordillera volcanic
central valley, this project
will protect 43,000ha and
pay 500 small farmers for
conservation and
reforestation (Equator
Environmental, 2007)
120
e 
tagefiL
unknown 350
unknown
